

Negotiating Moderation

The People and the Norwegian Environmental Movement

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Abstract

Since the 1960s democratic member based organizations (DMOs) have formed the back bone of the Norwegian environmental movement (NEM). A series of recent developments, however, have challenged both their dominant position and their need for popular support, prompting an investigation into the relation between the NEM DMOs and ‘the people’.

This thesis approaches the problematic by investigating how the relation between the DMOs and ‘the people’ is understood from the perspective of informants working within three NEM DMOs: *Norges naturvernforbund*, *Fremtiden i våre hender*, and *Folkeaksjonen for et oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja*. Through an analysis of semi-structured interviews from 12 informants I will examine three aspects of this relation, the DMOs’ movement connections, their collective identity and the impact negative public stereotypes have on their operation.

Based on these analyses I will argue that the Norwegian DMOs are inclusive organizations with a low level of collective identity, who are afraid of alienating the public by appearing too radical. Despite having relatively few supporters, the DMOs draw on the culturally specific image of *folkebevegelse* (popular movement) when presenting their organizations. The DMOs focus on low-level and short-term activism, lest a more intensive approach will alienate people, who are viewed as busy, but well-willing. They actively take measures to combat common stereotypes associated with their organizations. Sometimes this takes the form of policy changes, other times it is to hide their more radical positions by presenting their own identity and their message as moderate. As such the DMOs are engaging in a process of frame negotiation where they adjust their identity and their agenda to fit a more moderate image.

Acknowledgements

Little in life is as unpredictable as an Amazonian tributary. Under the canopy behind the river bend might linger a tapir, a toucan, or a turtle. You might run into a calm tribal village or suddenly face a disgorging pipeline spewing the river black with oil waste. The first draft of this thesis was called *Destruction of Pachamama*, it was to be an investigation into the cultural effects of the massive Chevron oil spills on the indigenous Secoya of eastern Ecuador. Hardly a thing remains of that project in the final thesis, however.

My own venture up the Amazon tributaries descended into misunderstandings, accusations, confusion and despair. Witnessing a people, a culture, steamrolled by ‘civilization’, took its toll. When violence ensued I had to leave, both the people who graciously had hosted me and my project.

After finally regrouping with a new project at home, I fell ill for more than a year. The process as a whole has been long and arduous, and has not been without its sacrifices on my own part as well as for others. I therefore want to thank those who have stayed with me through this ordeal, my mother and father, my brother and sister and my friends. Most of all I want to thank Tove, without your loving support this thesis would never have been finished.

I also want to thank the informants for their time, Jonas for his card, Desmond for his sound advice, and Anne-Line for all her practical assistance.

Abbreviations

DMO	Democratic member-based organization
FIVH	Framtiden i våre hender (Future in our Hands)
FOLVS	Folkeaksjonen for oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja (The People's movement for an oil free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja)
NEM	Norwegian environmental movement
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NMV	Norges miljøvernforbund
NNV	Norges naturvernforbund (The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature / Friends of the Earth Norway)
NSM	New Social Movements
NU	Natur og Ungdom (Nature and Youth / Young Friends of the Earth Norway)
RM	Resource Mobilization

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Chapter 1: The People and the Environment

1.1 Cause for an Investigation

Norwegian environmentalism as an organized effort can be traced back to 1914 and the founding of *Landsforeningen for Naturfredning i Norge*, the precursor of *Norges Naturvernforbund* (NNV). Long an elitist phenomenon, with few members and low social stratification, it championed a narrow field of issues centered on conservation efforts and outdoor recreation. During the 1960s this began to change. Internal democratic structures were developed, membership numbers rose, and mobilization efforts grew in importance (Bortne et al. 2002: 15). Environmentalism started to get more politicized and populist in orientation, and new organizations such as *Natur og Ungdom* (NU), NNV's independent youth division, and *Samarbeidsgruppe for natur- og miljøvern* (snm) were formed.¹ By 1970, and *Mardøla-aksjonen*, one could talk about a breakthrough for a proper Norwegian environmental movement (NEM). This organized protest, utilizing civil disobedience in an attempt to stop the damming of two waterfalls, marked the first alliance between local people and organized environmentalists (Gundersen 1996: 55). The ensuing golden age of Norwegian environmentalism (1970-75) saw a continued growth in public interest, as well as the foundation of alternative organizations like *Framtiden i våre hender* (FIVH) in 1973, who sought to mobilize the masses through the creation of a new lifestyle centered on solidarity and low consumption. The period as a whole was characterized by rising membership, increasing internal democratization and a continued interest in popular engagement and mobilization (Bortne et al. 2002: 16).

¹ Though unusual '(snm)' is the normal abbreviated form.

Since the 1970s democratic member-based organizations (DMOs), like NNV, NU and later also FIVH,² have continued to play an important role in the Norwegian environmental movement. Several developments since the golden age, however, can be seen to have challenged their dominant position and complicated the relation, which will be the thematic focus of this thesis, between these organizations and what we broadly might refer to as ‘the people’.

First, starting in the 1980s, a general trend within Scandinavian civil society has seen it become more professionalized and less member-based (Wijkström and Zimmer 2011: 17). Within NEM this can be seen, on the one hand, in the rise of new types of organizations without a member-based democracy (Østerud et al. 2003: 147). These include non-democratic NGOs, like *Bellona* and *Greenpeace*; research centers, such as *Cicero*, *Zero*, and *SUM*; as well as umbrella organizations, like *Broen til Framtiden*, *Klimaalliansen* and *Forum for Utvikling og Miljø*. The trend can also be seen within DMOs, where active members play a smaller part in favor of the rise of professional staff and secretariat (Gundersen 1996: 77). The result is what Bortne et al. calls: “An environmental field that to an increasing degree is project run [*prosjektstyrt*], research based and more elitist in character [...]” (Bortne et al. 2002: 157).

Second, membership levels among Norwegian environmental DMOs have had several spikes and falls since the 1970s, but have remained well below the level of the same sector in neighboring Sweden and Denmark. After reaching a nadir of 17.500 members at the turn of the millennium, NNV’s current membership stands at 21.212 (NNV 2015b), about half of what it was at its peak around 1990 (Bortne et al. 2002: 126-7). NNV has only recently been surpassed by FIVH, who in terms of members is Norway’s largest environmental DMO with 24.884 members. In comparison, the Swedish *Naturskyddsföreningen* (2015), according

² For FIVH’s development from movement to organization see chapters 4.2 and 5.2.

to their own numbers, counts 221.000 members, while the Danish *Naturfredningsforening* (2015) has 125.000.

Third, the forms of engagement and the roles of activists have changed. In the digital age social movements have access to a new set of tools such as e-mail, message boards, online petitions and social media, for recruitment, communication and activism (Pickerill 2001). Internationally, new actors like avaaz.org and 350.org have gathered millions in support of their environmental and climate campaigns organized online. In Norway FIVH (2013) has been prominent in online organizing, through campaigns such as ‘Evert the clothing companies’ (*Vreng kleskjedene*) where they ask for signatures and encourage people to confront companies on social media. Not only do these new tools change the role of active participants in these organizations, they also blur the line between active and passive supporters, because these campaigns “[...] create the impression of widespread social concern and thus of a large social movement even while ordinary supporters of the proposed change have to do remarkably little.” (Yearley 2005: 12).

Fourth, through its activity NEM has succeeded in institutionalizing several of its policies through both laws and institutions, and its rhetoric has been adopted across the political spectrum (Jørgensen 1997: 75). However, their increased prominence and influence has, according to Bortne et al. (2002), led to NEM being trapped by its own success. When environmentalism has become an integrated political area, taken care of by the state, the need for public engagement has faded (Bortne et al. 2002: 152).

Fifth, trust in both NEM and the environmental organizations has been high and rising. In 1995, 59,1% of a representative selection of the Norwegian public had ‘very great’ or ‘great’ trust (*tillit*) in the environmental organizations (Strømsnes 2001: 489). According to the World Values Survey, trust (*tiltro*) in NEM among the Norwegian public has increased from 63% in 1996 to 72% in 2007 (Listhaug

2008). This stands in contrast to how environmentalists are perceived elsewhere. Not only are trust levels considerably lower in other OECD countries such as the US, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands (World Values Survey 2015), but research on stereotypes conducted with Canadian and US participants has shown that environmentalists are perceived as eccentric and militant (Bashir et al. 2013). In contrast, Norwegian environmentalists have been shown to harbor similar values as the majority of the population (Grendstad et al. 2006: 83).

Finally, a continuing rise in consumption levels challenges the view that people are willing or able to adhere to the goals of the movement. According to the most recent numbers from Statistics Norway, waste levels are now at a record level (Skjerpen and Vinju 2015). In addition, since 1958 Norwegian consumption levels, measured by household expenditures adjusted for inflation, have more than tripled (Strand and Thorsen 2013). Both trends can be seen as signs of a public disengaged from central aims of the movement.

Taken together these developments warrant an investigation into the present relationship between the environmental DMOs and ‘the people’. What importance does public support and member participation have for the democratic member-based organizations in NEM today? What roles do they see themselves as occupying in relation to ‘the people’? In a time where the rise of non-democratic foundations means it is no longer obvious that a large member base necessarily translates into political influence (Østerud et al. 2003: 146), how do the DMOs understand their relation to ‘the people’?

These questions grow in importance if we consider both the pressing concern of the issues the movement claims humanity is faced with, and the need, in democratic societies, for public support to solve them. The Norwegian environmental movement has championed a whole range of causes spanning from deep-ecological ideas about positive human–environment relations to critiques of issues such as resource depletion, species eradication, ecosystem and

landscape destruction, excessive consumption, and global warming. These causes haven't merely been vacuous intellectual pursuits. They have been accompanied by a clear rhetoric, often emphasizing calls for dramatic societal and individual changes, and paired with an insistence on 'the need to act now!'. Ultimately, the movement relies on public support through activism, mobilization and protests in order to effectuate these changes (Rootes 2003: 2). A perennial difficulty appears at this juncture because in order to achieve their goals, then, the environmental movement must in many cases balance their critique of 'the people' with their need for support from the same 'people'. Adding to the problem is that such a critique, while alienating some, might be essential in order to mobilize core activists (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102-3). In her study of FIVH, Hansen (2007: 71) describes a similar tension between the need for a shared core of stringent beliefs and practices which gathers the participants around a cause, and the openness required to gather as many supporters as possible. This is a question of identity as much as it is about strategy. Do the Norwegian environmental DMOs handle this tension by adopting an inclusive identity to gain popular support, an exclusionary identity prioritizing core activists, or do they attempt to appeal to both?

1.2 Research Question

So far I have established the relation between the environmental DMOs and 'the people' as a problem field. As such it can be approached and studied in a wide variety of manners. What I want to focus on is how this relation is understood from the perspective of informants working within these DMOs. Opting for this approach is done, first, because grasping how the informants understand and make meaning out of their context is interesting in itself. More importantly, however, is that such an approach could yield 'expert knowledge' from those who through their daily work have the most intimate knowledge of the problem

field. In addition, the way this relation is understood within the organizations contributes to the interpretative processes that shapes the organizations' strategy. Focusing on the DMOs understanding, then, can reveal the interplay between understanding and choice of strategy. Further, by following this path I will be moving into an area that has been given comparatively little attention within the study of NEM.³

My main research question is formulated as follows: How do the Norwegian environmental DMOs understand the relation between their own organization and 'the people'? Before I describe how the question will be answered I will clarify what I mean by each of the three central terms here employed: 'environmental DMOs', 'understanding', and 'the people'.

Environmental DMOs

Extrapolating on Spear's definition of DMOs as organizations that "[...] serve a membership and give that membership democratic rights of governance [...]" (2004: 33), an environmental DMO's singular additional feature is that it operates within the environmental sector. These organizations distinguish themselves from umbrella organizations by having people (and not other organizations) as members; and from non-democratic member-based organization by giving their members the right to have an influence in the governing of the organization through participation and voting rights. Their democratic features thus pertain to their internal democracy.

The complicated part of this definition, concerns the meaning of 'environmental' in the special case of Norwegian environmentalism. Even though modern environmentalism is an international phenomenon, Grendstad et al. has argued that the Norwegian variant is a unique case defined by two anomalies, which, put together, separate it from the rest. The anomaly relevant for our present purpose

³ See chapter 2.

pertains to the political system where adversarial actors are included and welcomed by the state in what is referred to as a state-friendly society (2006: 2-3).⁴ The state's inclusive role also gives it a key position in determining who is included in and excluded from 'the Norwegian environmental field' (*miljøvernfeltet*) (Bortne et al. 2002: 80). The Ministry of Climate and Environment,⁵ who through its selective funding practice is a central arbiter of both status and legitimacy, divides this field into four categories (see Table 1): environmental organizations, umbrella organizations, children and youth organizations, and environmental foundations (Klima- og Miljødepartementet 2014).

	Environmental organizations (DMOs)	Umbrella organizations	Children and youth orgs.	Foundations
Environmental movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Framtiden i våre hender - Norges miljøvernforbund - Norges naturvernforbund - Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sabima - Grønn Hverdag (now defunct) - Regnskogsfondet 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Natur og Ungdom - Miljøagentene 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Idébanken - Miljøstiftelsen Bellona - WWF Norge - Zero
Cultural conservation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forbundet Kysten - Fortidsminneforeningen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Kulturvernforbundet 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Norsk Kulturarv
Outdoor recreation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Den Norske Turistforening - Norges Jeger- og Fiskerforbund 			

Table 1 shows the Ministry of Climate and Environment's list of funding recipients which categorizes the environmental organizations into four categories. The distinction between environmental, cultural and recreational organizations in this list is my own.

Notable omissions from this list of funding recipients are organizations who work within the fields of animal protection (*dyreververn*), such as *NOAH* and

⁴ The second anomaly is ideological, referred to as the local community perspective, and centers the focus of Norwegian environmental to the protection of man in nature. Both will be given further treatment in chapter 2.

⁵ Up until 2014 The Ministry of Climate and Environment was known as The Ministry of Environmental Protection (*Miljøverndepartementet*).

Greenpeace, and organic food production, such as *Oikos*. The exclusion of these fields from environmentalism is not particular to the Ministry. Whereas organic food production is seen as part of the agricultural sector, the opinion that animal protection is not environmentalism is shared by the ‘proper’ environmental organizations (Bortne et al. 2002: 89). Another peculiarity of the Ministry list is the inclusion of several cultural conservation and outdoor recreation organizations whose operation is only tangentially related to environmentalism proper. In their classification, Grendstad et al. excludes the most prominent of these organizations, *Den Norske Turistforening*, from the group of core environmental organizations.⁶ Their reasoning, partially based on input from environmental organization leaders, was that this organization did not have environmentalism as its prime task (Grendstad et al. 2006: 49). If we, by the same token, remove the other culture and outdoors organizations from the Ministry list, what we are left with is an outline of the organizations usually associated with ‘the Norwegian environmental movement’ (*miljøbevegelsen*); organizations whose prime concern is the environment.⁷

Save for the exception of *Natur og Ungdom*, the environmental DMOs are all located within the Ministry’s environmental organization category. In this way the environmental DMOs are not identical to, but form a central part of both ‘the Norwegian environmental field’ (*miljøvernfeltet*) as well as the narrower ‘Norwegian environmental movement’ (*miljøbevegelsen*). They are *Framtiden i våre hender* (FIVH), *Natur og Ungdom* (NU), *Norges miljøvernforbund* (NMV), *Norges naturvernforbund* (NNV), and *Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja* (FOLVS).

⁶ Since the list provided by Grendstad et al. of the core organization within Norwegian environmentalism is not recent (and thus both lacks recent additions, and includes organizations now defunct) I have not taken that list as a starting point.

⁷ Missing is only *Greenpeace* (which in addition to its animal protection activity commonly is included as a part of the environmental movement on the count of its other environmental activity), and several umbrella organizations, such as *Broen til Framtiden*, and *Klimaalliansen*.

Understanding

The main interest of this thesis is the way environmental DMOs understand the people. Since organizations aren't subjects capable of understanding in the conventional sense, a specification of what is meant by 'understanding' is needed. In this thesis I will use the term 'understanding' as a broad cover term for a series of related cognitive phenomena. By way of illustration, working within environmental organizations are staff, activists, organizational leaders and elected board members. Through cooperating, in a shared environment, and working for the same goals they develop certain shared assumptions, beliefs, knowledge, frames, in short, a shared understanding of their own organization, their work and their context. As Dahlberg et al. says: "Only through interaction with others is meaning established for objects [...]" (2008: 149). My interest is in these shared understandings inherent in the organizations. Described as such the term shows similarities to several other concepts used to describe shared cognitive phenomena within social movement studies, namely frames, discourse, cognitive praxis, and ideology. These terms are notoriously fickle and subject to differing interpretations (Polletta and Ho 2006: 3), but they all refer to different aspects of the broad phenomenon of understanding. Whereas ideology and discourse are concepts that refer to overarching systems of beliefs tacitly present or passively encroaching on groups or individuals, the terms frame and cognitive praxis rely more on agency and denote how organizations actively and explicitly shape how states or events are understood (Yearley 2005: 14-5, Polletta and Ho 2006: 3-4). What they all have in common is that they describe cognitive elements that are shared within groups, and that both constrain and enable the interpretation of the world (Dryzek 2005: 9). Instead of limiting the investigation to a specific aspect of the understanding I will approach the topic in a heuristic manner. I will not commit to a theoretical language, beyond the broad cover term understanding.

It is important to distinguish, however, between three different ways these understandings manifest themselves, each representing a source for empirical data. The first way is through normal quotidian praxis, the manifest understanding is here implicitly present in the behavior and actions of groups or individuals as they engage with their tasks. Second, understandings can also be manifest through what I term non-official presentation. This refers to how those working within an organization present who they are and how they work, in a relatively spontaneous fashion. The last way an organization's understanding manifests itself is through the act of official presentation. The understanding is in this case presented in a deliberative manner through the organizations' official documents, speeches, and statements. Whereas an ethnographic study aiming for a thick description primarily would focus on the first two, a discourse study would normally limit itself to the level of official presentation (Dryzek 2005: 75-6). These levels of manifestation should have overarching similarities, but they could also be very distinct, e.g., there might be discrepancies between how an organization claims to be working and how their actual praxis unfolds. What they have in common is that all have the potential of revealing different aspects of how environmental DMOs understand their relation to 'the people', and a complete study of this topic would have to include all three levels. This thesis, however, will mainly be based on non-official presentations, and will only to a limited extent make use of official documents, and then in a supplementary capacity.

My focus will be on how central staff and leadership talk about the situation of their own organization. This does not mean I am interested in these informants' private experiences. I am interested in their views in so far as they are knowledgeable operatives that play an important part in shaping the workings of their organization. As Tarrow notes: "[...] movement leadership has a creative function in selecting forms of collective action that people will respond to. Leaders invent, adapt, and combine various forms of contention to gain support

from people who might otherwise stay at home.” (2011: 29). Through this work the chosen informants have an intimate understanding of the problematic of this thesis: the relation between the DMOs and ‘the people’. Furthermore, through working in the same environment with the same challenges, their understanding is in many cases shared. Through analyzing both the implicit and explicit levels of the understanding manifest in the informants’ interview statements I will try to reveal how certain phenomena are understood within their organizations. This approach enables us to illuminate issues which the official documents do not touch upon, and it could also open up in-depth discussions which perhaps show less degree of coherence and polish.

The people

Whereas the extension of ‘environmental DMOs’ has been properly defined above, I want to hold ‘the people’ as a term, open for a broad area of interpretation. The aim of the investigation is to try to capture how the relation between the DMOs and ‘the people’ is understood. Since this also includes capturing how the informants understand ‘the people’, as such, it makes little sense to limit the application of the term at the outset of the investigation. Dahlberg et al. claim that: “Openness in lifeworld research means entering the world of a person and leaving behind any structures that would shape one’s expectation for what will be found.” (2008: 112). This is correct up to a point, but any investigation has to be led by some kind of pre-understanding of what one is looking for, in this case ‘the people’. As Heidegger says: “Every investigation is guided beforehand by what is sought.” (2006: 5). In this way positive terms like ‘the public’, ‘supporters’, ‘volunteers’, ‘active members’ and ‘passive members’, are all included in our pre-understanding of ‘the people’ just as much as more negatively charged notions like ‘suspicious skeptics’, ‘lazy apathetics’, and ‘disengaged clicktivists’. The only group excluded from ‘the people’ is the

informants themselves, who all, save two highly involved volunteers, belong to the central level of their organizations.

An important caveat at this junction: The aim of this thesis is not to provide a full categorical schemata of the various ways the DMOs designate the people. It will not be limited to how ‘the people’ is understood as something else, say a member or supporter. First, because, as Offe notes, within movements and grassroots organizations these designations are often fuzzy and in dispute:

[...] the concept of the ‘base’ or the ‘people’ remains operationally fuzzy and the constant object of disputes, which is exactly what happens when quasi-empirical collectivities such as ‘all those affected’, all mankind, all members of specific ethnic, racial, age, or gender category are used as referents in the names of which political action is staged. (Offe 1990: 237)

Second, the aim of the thesis is to look at the relation between the DMOs and the people. Thus, of far more important is the description of how these terms are contextualized by the informants.

1.3 Methodological Considerations

When the meaning of the question now has become clearer I will briefly give a methodological characterization of the thesis. First of all, the thesis is exploratory, in the sense described by Stebbins (2008: 325). As such it will be based on the collection of open-ended data from semi-structured interviews of informants working within the DMOs. The analysis will also be based on the concepts and topics emerging from the interview material. The thesis sets out to explore the informants’ understanding, not to confirm previous theories on the subject. Second, the investigation is interpretive. It seeks to interpret the informants’ understanding with a focus on the way they give meaning to the

activities and operation of the organizations they work in. Third, the thesis is descriptive. It will be limited to describing how the relation between the DMOs and the people is understood; it will not attempt to construct a theory explaining why the relation is understood in a certain way.

Fourth, the thesis could also be called comparative, but in a weak sense. The comparative nature of the study does not mean that a systematic point-by-point comparative analysis is the aim. I am interested both in the sector as a whole and in the understanding involved in the individual organizations. Of the five organizations that fall under the above sketched category of environmental DMOs in Norway I have chosen to focus on the following three: *Norges Naturvernforbund*, *Framtiden i våre hender*, and *Folkeaksjonen oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja*. This enables me both to cover the Norwegian environmental DMOs as a whole while at the same time giving enough room to analyze each organization more thoroughly. By focusing on three DMOs I will use comparison as an instrument to bring out interesting aspects concerning the sector as a whole. By ‘pooling’ the participants in one general notion of NEM, however, I could risk losing valuable differences distinguishing the DMOs. Separating the DMOs in the analyses would instead allow me to draw comparisons when this serves to add nuances to the interpretations. The selection of these three organizations, and the exclusion of the last two, NU and NMV, were done on the basis of the following considerations. NNV and FIVH were selected due to their size and prominence within the field, being the two largest environmental DMOs. As for the third organization, the choice of FOLVS was done first because it provides several contrast points. Whereas the concerns of NU and NMV show great similarity in scope with NNV in particular, FOLVS focus on one single issue sets it apart from both NNV and FIVH. Selecting FOLVS also meant that the three different organizations all stem from a separate era. Second, I already had contacts within the organization, which would greatly facilitate the interview process. Third, and most importantly, FOLVS fashion themselves as a

folkeaksjon (people's action), a somewhat anachronistic move that harkens back to the popular mobilizations of the 1970s. That the organization in its very name thematized the relation between them and the people made it especially relevant for this thesis. In addition to having something in common, all three being environmental DMOs with a presence across the country, the organizations are sufficiently different in both their history and their operation to provide the opportunity both for comparing the differences between them as well as looking at their overarching similarities.

1.4 Outline of Structure

The relation between the Norwegian environmental DMOs and 'the people' is not a new topic of study. In chapter 2 I will look at two main attempts at describing this relation. A study by Dryzek et al. (2003) has evaluated NEM after the 'social movement theory' (SMT) definition of a 'social movement'. A group of researchers (which I refer to as the Bergen Group⁸) have through a series of books and articles also evaluated NEM based on the Norwegian term *folkebevegelse* (popular movement) (Bortne et al. 2002, Grendstad et al. 2006). I will argue that since neither of these definitions were found to fit the case of NEM, it is an open question as to how the DMOs' relation to the people should be described. In this chapter I will also look at how the theoretical concepts of collective identity and framing can shed light on the relation in question. I will claim that the literature on the Norwegian case has omitted focusing on the role identity plays within single organizations, how organizational identities relates to its context, and how identities are employed strategically. In chapter 3, I will describe the choice of method and situate the investigation within a qualitative methodology. This will involve describing the selection of informants, the interview sessions, the considerations of the analysis process, and the credibility

⁸ See chapter 2.2.

of the analysis. Chapter 4 will provide an introduction to the three organizations, focused mainly on their history and development as well as their organizational structure. This introduction will serve as an initial contextualization for the following three analysis chapters.

In chapter 5, I will pose the question of how the DMO-informants understand participation in their own organizations. This will involve looking at local group influence and popular mobilization in NNV; democracy, networks and identity in FIVH; and local adherence and popular support in FOLVS. I will argue that the informants not only draw on the image of *folkebevegelse* when they describe their own organizations, they emphasize the importance of grassroots involvement, and describe an aspiration for becoming *folkebevegelse*r. In chapter 6 I will ask what role the informants see their own organizations as playing in relation to the people. I will look at the voice-provider role of NNV, the educator-mobilizer role of FIVH, and the facilitator role of FOLVS. I will argue that all these roles share the similarity of assisting activism. As such they also indicate the inclusive identity of the DMOs. In chapter 7 I will look at the stereotypes the informants perceive the public to have of their organizations. I will describe the stereotypes of negativism in the case of NNV, moralism in the case of FIVH, and elitism in the case of FOLVS. I will argue that the way the DMOs distance themselves from these stereotypes while at the same time attempting to hold on to a more radical agenda, is indicative of a process of frame negotiation, where the DMOs adjust their identity and their agenda to fit a more moderate image.

Through the analysis of these three topics we will arrive at a fairly comprehensive view of how the informants understand their organization's relation to 'the people'. This will be summarized in chapter 8, where I attempt to connect the findings of the analysis with the questions posed in the literary review.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The Norwegian environmental DMOs form part of two distinct, but related, political phenomena. On the one hand they are described, and often self-identify, as belonging to the environmental movement. As such the DMOs fall under the domain of ‘social movement theory’ (SMT), a diverse theoretical body that aims to give a full account of the broad social movement phenomena. With a few exceptions, such as Løken (1999), this perspective has largely been lacking in the study of Norwegian environmentalism, and in the study of Norwegian civil society in general (Seippel 2003: 181, Andreassen 2006: 147). Especially apposite to my purposes are the two central SMT concepts of ‘framing’ and ‘collective identity’, which both will be detailed below. On the other hand the DMOs can also be seen as a part of regular institutionalized interest politics. Operating within Norwegian corporatist society these organizations have been drawn into a close relationship with the state. In this regard the DMOs have been extensively studied by Norwegian political scientists as an interest group or as a *folkebevegelse* (people’s movement). The foremost example of this tradition is the considerable empirical work done by the Rokkan Center in Bergen (henceforth the Bergen Group), which I will draw on extensively. The overarching task of this literary review, however, is not to provide a systematic survey of these two fields, but to focus on a subset of issues related to our problematic, employing perspectives from both traditions. In chapter 2.1 I will describe and lay out the differences between the SMT tradition’s concept of ‘social movement’ and the Norwegian term ‘*folkebevegelse*’, which both can be seen as describing the relation between the DMOs and the people. Building on this differentiation, in chapter 2.2, I will examine two studies of Norwegian environmentalism. Both conclude that it falls short of being a movement, prompting the question of how environmental DMOs should be assessed. In chapter 2.3 I will look at collective identity theories and how they describe the

relation between organizations and individuals. I will put emphasis on the difference between inclusive and exclusive identities; the way institutionalization affects movement identity; and how a dearth of focus on the way identity plays within the DMOs paves the way for asking how identities are employed strategically within NEM. In chapter 2.4 I will look at framing theory. It offers a coherent terminology for describing a central sense-making aspect of social movement praxis, specifically on how collective identities are shaped. Then, in chapter 2.5 I will summarize the state of research on the relation between the NEM DMOs and ‘the people’.

2.1 Social Movement or *Folkebevegelse*?

Social movement theory is a broad field encompassing several different theoretical approaches (e.g. resource mobilization theory, political process/opportunity theory, framing theory, new social movement theory, collective identity theory), while spanning disciplines (e.g. sociology, political science, social psychology, organizational theory), objects of study (e.g. environmental movement, environmentalism, environmental organizations), and methodologies (e.g. constructivism, objectivism) (Hjelmar 1996, Tarrow 2011). In the 1980s a distinction was commonly made between the Anglo-American resource mobilization (RM) paradigm and the predominantly European focus on new social movements (NSM) (Hannigan 1985, Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 23). The former, emphasizing the role of social movement organizations (SMOs), attempted to provide a broad theoretical framework for the understanding of all social movements (McCarthy and Zald 2009). Whereas earlier collective behavior theories had viewed movements as spontaneous, often irrational, reactions to structural problems, within RM theory movements were studied as a rational and organized phenomenon (Hannigan 1985: 436, Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 11). Their aim was to understand how rational actors employ resources (such as funding, contacts, or popular support) to obtain their political goals

(Seippel 2003: 187). The RM approach has primarily been criticized on two counts by NSM theories. First, constructivist perspectives (such as framing theory and collective identity theory, the latter associated with NSM) criticized the RM assumption that the grievances causing movement action were a stable feature of society. Instead these theories proposed that both interests and grievances have to be interpreted as such in order to motivate collective action, and that these interpretations are actively created and shaped by the movements themselves (Snow et al. 1986: 465, Polletta and Jasper 2001: 283-4).⁹ Second, NSM theories sought to describe the contextual and historical nature of movements, both aspects which RM theory had neglected. According to NSM theories, the rise of new social formations, variously dubbed ‘post-industrial’, ‘network’ or ‘information’ society, after WWII also saw a withering away of structural and cultural restraints. The new movements that started to arise in the 1960s (the environmental, civil rights, feminist, LGBT, and peace movements) took advantage of this void to fashion new collective identities and new political goals (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 23, Polletta and Jasper 2001: 286, Seippel 2003: 188). In contradistinction to the old labor movements, the new movements were not based on class conflict. Support came primarily from the educated middle classes, and participation was based on altruistic values, a focus on collective goods and the good life, and often centered on identity issues (Brulle 2000: 94). The NSM perspectives have also received criticism, mainly for being ill-defined, for exaggerating the difference between new and old movements, and for lacking an empirical base for their theoretical claims (Dalton 1994: 9, Brulle 2000: 94-5).

Since the 1990s, several attempts have been made, by e.g. Dalton (1994: 10), Della Porta and Diani (2006), and Tarrow (2011: 29-30), to fuse elements from both traditions, and the field is now characterized by a general trend towards

⁹ Collective identity and framing theory will be further examined in sub-chapters 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.

synthesis (Seippel 2003: 189, Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 30). Even though SMT is a broad field, Diani's definition of a social movement forms an apt starting point as it lays out three features central to how the SMT literature understands social movements. For Diani, social movements "[...] are involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; share a distinct identity." (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 20).¹⁰ By fighting against perceived unjust conditions or structures, social movements enter into both cultural and political conflicts with established elites. They arise outside the confines of the state and institutionalized power structures, with which they have a conflictual relationship (Andreassen 2006: 148).¹¹ Though movement organizations have a central role to play in movements, "[n]o single organized actor, no matter how powerful, can claim to represent a movement as a whole." (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 21). A movement is instead conceived of as a wider phenomenon, a network of informal bonds between both individuals and organizations. Such networks can be built on preexisting linkages and connections between people, or they could be created by the movements themselves (Tarrow 2011: 132). What holds these bonds together is the movement's collective identity. This identity goes beyond single events and pertains to groups and individuals who regard themselves as part of a larger collective. It involves a common purpose and a shared understanding of the struggle of the movement, as well as a demarcation of who is a part of the movement and who is opposed to it (Melucci 1996: 75, Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94).

¹⁰ These three components are echoed in Tarrow's definition of social movements as "[...] sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on resonant collective action frames, and the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents." (Tarrow 2011: 7).

¹¹ One exception is McCarthy and Zald (2009), the founders of RM theory, who define social movements as "[...] a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society [...]" (McCarthy and Zald 2009: 196). This definition is neutral as to the level of conflict.

Folkebevegelse

As stated above, in the literature on the Norwegian environmental movement, SMT perspectives have been lacking. Instead movements have been approached through the term *folkebevegelse* (people's movement), which has similar, but somewhat different connotations. It is a broad term, alluding to Norwegian history while emphasizing a broad popular appeal spanning different interest and social strata. The term is most commonly associated with the peasant, labor, sobriety, layman, sport and nynorsk movements that started to gain political clout in the 19th century (Østerud et al. 2003: 143). It can be both political and non-political in application. The Norwegian Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*) was often referred to as a *folkebevegelse*, especially in its early history (Keul and Kjeldstadli 1973), and the term is also applied to 'organized sports' (*idrett*) (Kulturdepartementet 1992). A central account and definition of the term is to be found in *Makt- og demokratiutredningen* (Power and Democracy Governmental Report), by Østerud et al. (2003). For them there is an added conflict dimension, defining *folkebevegelser* as "[...] organizations that want to greatly change society instead of just serving the interests of its own members, and which often represents an ideology that creates conflict." (Ibid.: 141). According to Andreassen (2006), the report puts special emphasis on two features. Organizationally, a *folkebevegelse* is a broad member organization with a hierarchically structured local and central level. In terms of orientation, it works towards aims benefitting the society as a whole, not only its members (Andreassen 2006: 158-60). Østerud et al. (2003) contrasts *folkebevegelser* with 'here and now' (*her og nå*) organizations. The latter represent a newer organizational type which relies on the persuasive power of lobby and media savvy individuals, rather than popular support, to obtain political goals. These organizations have the swift satisfaction of their members' needs as their rationale, and they are described as having weak or no ideological anchorage (Østerud et al. 2003: 142-6).

Andreassen describes four major differences between the SMT and the Norwegian conception of movements (2006: 160-7): First, whereas for Østerud et al. *folkebevegelser* are associated with organizations, the SMT tradition focuses on networks of individuals and organizations. Second, while the term *folkebevegelse* emphasizes both broad and large popular support, SMT theory, on the other hand, requires neither in order to qualify as a movement (Ibid.: 160-4). Small and non-democratic organizations, such as Bellona, could easily fit within a social movement by the SMT definition, while they, on the count of their organizational structure and size, would not be considered a *folkebevegelse*. Third, Andreassen points out, instead of distinguishing between organizations that are directed either toward serving member interests or society, SMT stresses the connection between participation and identity (Ibid.: 160-1). To this point it should be added that within SMT the process of collective identity formation is seen as one where individual interests are identified with collective interests (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102). But, given that SMT doesn't require a movement to be broad, the collective interests of a social movement are not necessarily the same as the societal interest of a broad and large *folkebevegelse*. This means that within SMT the collective identity of movements is often, though not always, portrayed as radical or in opposition to large swathes of the population as well as the dominant power structures (Tarrow 2011: 6). This leads us to the fourth difference: Whereas both traditions stress the conflict aspect of movements, they do so in different ways (Andreassen 2006: 165). Even though Østerud et al. highlight the conflict dimension, they describe *folkebevegelser* as having established a very close working relation with the state (Østerud et al. 2003: 144). The SMT tradition, on the other hand, connects the process of increased interaction with the state with a loss of movement characteristics and identity (Andreassen 2006: 165).

2.2 Norwegian Environmentalism and the State

Turning the focus to Norwegian environmentalism, I will in the following focus on two approaches, one by Dryzek et al. (2003) and another by the Bergen Group detailed in Bortne et al. (2002), and Grendstad et al. (2006). Whereas the former employs a definition of movements closer to the SMT tradition, the Bergen Group (whose work also appears in *Makt- og demokratiutredningen*) draws on the notion of *folkebevegelser*. Both, however, seek to understand Norwegian environmentalism as a special case because of its close relation to the state.

The Dryzek study

The Dryzek study sorts the modern states after two formal criteria yielding four different ideal state variants. First, they distinguish between inclusive and exclusive states, where the latter type restricts representation or denies access to certain political actors. The inclusive state is more open to a broad set of interests and movements. It is also characterized by corporatism, a tripartite arrangement where policy is decided through agreements between labor unions, business federations and the executive branch of government. The second distinction is between active and passive states. While the former actively intervenes to control and affect both the content and the power of interest groups or movements, the latter does little or nothing to heighten or lower the standing of specific groups. Norway, with the sole exception of Mexico, is grouped alone in the actively inclusive state category (Dryzek et al. 2003: 6-8). For Dryzek et al. Norway is unusual because its corporatist inclusive structure also extends to groups outside of business and labor. In this assessment they follow Rokkan, whose dictum, ‘votes count, resources decide’, refers to how groups with low parliamentary support (votes) can achieve influence through corporatist channels (resources) (Asdal 2011: 29). But they also add that through the increased power of the Norwegian parliament (*Stortinget*) since the 1990s, environmental DMOs have

also been provided a greater opportunity for lobbying directly (Dryzek et al. 2003: 26-7).

This intimate state context has several consequences for Norwegian environmentalism, according to the Dryzek study. First, it means that it is difficult to start a social movement because the state gets there first by funding and supporting, thus institutionalizing, activists (Ibid.: 8). Second, when environmental DMOs receive government funding, and committee participation and lobbying form the basis of their operation, it enables these groups to neglect their membership (Ibid.: 100). Third, the closed door committee negotiations leave ordinary members with little influence, and mobilization efforts also suffer from a public perception that sees no need for action due to Norway's perceived status as an environmental pioneer (Ibid.: 24). With these factors in mind the Dryzek study concludes that: "Nowhere in this sweep of Norwegian history can we find much that looks like a new social movement, the anti-dam protests notwithstanding." (Ibid.: 27). According to Dryzek et al. a social movement is "[...] an association or set of associations organized around a common interest that seeks to influence collective outcomes without obtaining authoritative offices of government." (Ibid.: 2). Key in this definition is that social movements are understood in direct opposition to the state. By this criterion, Dryzek et al. exclude the Norwegian DMOs from the social movement phenomena and instead place them as "[...] arms of the state [...]" (Ibid.: 3). In a later assessment of the Norwegian case Dryzek concludes: "One hazard accompanying the inclusion of greens and environmentalists in corporatist government is [the] depletion of the public sphere, as former activists are attracted into government, and accept moderation [...] as the price to be paid." (Dryzek 2005: 236). According to Dryzek, then, in the Norwegian case, there never was an environmental movement at all, instead environmentalism has been coopted and fully institutionalized, to the detriment of the public sphere.

The Bergen Group

The most extensive study of the Norwegian environmental field has been done through a series of books and articles by a group of researchers (Øystein Bortne, Gunnar Grendstad, Per Selle and Kristin Strømsnes) connected to the Rokkan Center (previously the LOS center) at the University of Bergen (see especially: Bortne et al. 2002, Grendstad et al. 2006). They agree with the Dryzek study, both on the assertion that country specific structural factors are central when charting the development of environmentalism, and in the study's description of the Norwegian case as unique based on the state's inclusion of adversarial actors and interests (Grendstad et al. 2006: 27). That notwithstanding, the Bergen Group finds the Dryzek study significantly wanting. They claim it misunderstands the relation between the state and civil society in Norway. The state, according to the Bergen Group, is neither as dominant nor as suffocating as Dryzek et al. hold (Ibid.: 12-3). Relying on the concept of *folkebevegelse*, they point out that the Norwegian state has been structured by the struggle of mass movements and voluntary organizations for representation and power, giving people's movements a prominent, mythical place in Norwegian consciousness (Bortne et al. 2002: 20). This translates both into an intimate set of formal and informal links between movements and the state, but also, on the count of these links, a high degree of trust in the state. For movements and other civil society actors, then, state cooperation yields not only influence and funding, but also public legitimacy (Ibid.: 56). The state is seen as the solution, not the problem. The intimate relation between the state and the environmental organizations, however, does have a price tag, namely in the form of “[...] responsibility, some loss of autonomy, less ideological purity, and that the organizations also have to take into account the demands of the state [...]” (Grendstad et al. 2006: 18). According to the Bergen Group, this intimate relation does not inhibit the organizations’ ability to criticize the state, on the contrary. Norwegian democracy, they claim, is especially open to input from DMOs with extensive

local networks (Ibid.: 19). Since the 1960s the environmental DMOs have had a tight connection between their central and local levels, thus giving the grassroots access and influence over the organizations. This is a structure the state has actively encouraged through funding (Bortne et al. 2002: 58). By avoiding the common development of a split or dual-organizational society, with little grassroots influence at the central level, Norwegian civil society is characterized as among the most vibrant in the world (Grendstad et al. 2006: 14). Nor is the close connection seen as resulting in a loss of organizational autonomy. The Bergen Group instead points out that state interference in organizational matters is virtually non-existent, and that because of their close relationship, the state is also to a high degree influenced by the organizations (Ibid.: 21).

The close relationship between the environmental DMOs and the state does, however, pose several challenges to the relation between the organizations and the people. First, as environmentalism to a certain extent has succeeded in becoming an integrated policy area taken care of by the state, the need for volunteers to fight for the cause is diminished (Bortne et al. 2002: 152). Second, the state's preference for an increased use of umbrella organizations – to facilitate interaction with the environmental sector – moves the location of decision making away from the realm of member meetings and popular engagement (Ibid.: 149). Third, in order to develop an expertise that satisfies the state's requirements for cooperation, the environmental sector has begun to favor professional administrators and experts. This to the detriment of volunteer workers and resulting in the “[...] possible exclusion of ordinary people [...]” (Ibid.: 149-50). Given these trends, the Bergen Group therefore speculates that Norwegian environmentalism could be on its way toward the scenario described by Dryzek above (Grendstad et al. 2006: 156), which the Bergen Group characterizes as a dual-organizational society, i.e., a fully state-oriented environmental sector “[...] without the backing of a real movement [...]” (Bortne et al. 2002: 148). Such an outcome had not yet arrived, at the time of the Bergen

Group's study, but they nevertheless claim that: "[...] the Norwegian environmental organizations by themselves do not have the strength to form a *folkebevegelse*, neither together or individually." (Ibid.: 156). This assessment is in line with the bemoaning of the current "[...] total lack of successful *folkebevegelser* [...]" from Østerud et al. (2003: 141), and is mainly based on an evaluation of the organizations' membership size. Bellona, MVF, and NU are all too small individually and too different when considered together to qualify as a *folkebevegelse*. NNV, on the other hand, is disqualified on the count of their too close governmental cooperation (Bortne et al. 2002: 156).

Overall the consensus seems to be that the Norwegian environmental DMOs do not belong to the movement phenomenon, neither in the sense of a social movement (on the count of the intimate state relation), nor in the sense of a *folkebevegelse* (because of the limited size of the organizations). This, however, poses the problem of how the DMOs should be assessed. The Dryzek study refers to the DMOs as 'voluntary groups' and, as earlier noted, as 'arms of the state' (Dryzek et al. 2003: 107). These descriptions, nevertheless, seem to gloss over both the focus on mass mobilization and democracy which characterize the history and identity of these organizations, especially in the 1960s and 70s, and the fact that it is common among the DMOs to identify themselves as part of *miljøbevegelsen* (the environmental movement), see for example Lem (1996: 167) and Sørensen (1996: 139). As we have seen, the Bergen Group describes several trends signaling the rise of a dual-organizational society. From their writing it is unclear how far the DMOs had progressed in this direction. They do not treat the DMO as professional 'here and now' organizations, even though they note that the DMOs have undergone significant professionalization. That their work was mainly done based on data collected between 1995 and 2000, also poses the question of how far this transition has progressed since then. Rejecting the term *folkebevegelse*, the Bergen Group accepts the description of the DMOs as part of *miljøbevegelsen* (Bortne et al. 2002: 38). They do not, however, specify

what role this movement identity has within the organizations. What kind of movement is this, if it is not a *folkebevegelse*? The relation between the people and the DMOs is in this regard left unclear. These questions bring us into the next topic of movement identity.

2.3 Identity and Participation

Collective identity is not only, as we saw in chapter 2.1, an important facet of SMT, but it is also a concept which, at least to an extent, attempts to encapsulate the relation between movement organizations and the people. Della Porta and Diani (2006) describe collective identity as “[...] the process by which social actors recognize themselves – and are recognized by other actors – as part of broader groupings, and develop emotional attachment to them.” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 91). Collective identity is that which draws organizations and individuals together to fight a common cause. In this capacity it is used within SMT to answer Olson’s free rider problem and explain why people participate in movements in a way that is rational (Ibid.: 102). Olson (1965), an economist, claims that for an individually rational actor, it would not be rational to participate in a large lobby organization despite having shared interests. By participating the actor would be assuming the cost (time, effort, risk) herself, whereas the reward would befall her even without her participation (Olson 1965: 11). On this short term, utility maximizing model, shared interest is not enough to motivate participation (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 289, Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102). Instead, participation also requires either coercion or the distribution of selective incentives that give greater benefits to those who participate (Olson 1965: 51). Mass movement participation, where shared interests are present, but extra incentives are lacking, is by Olson dismissed as a form of ‘nonrational or irrational behavior’ in the form of a ‘psychological disturbance’ induced by an alienation from society (Ibid.: 161-2).

Not wanting to reject movement mobilization as an irrational phenomenon, collective identity theorists have sought to describe movement participation in a more positive light. Polletta and Jasper (2001) suggests that collective identity “[...] seemed to capture better the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize [...]” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 284). By sharing a collective identity, people also share a set of prior norms and obligations, the observance of which motivates participation (Ibid.: 290). In a similar vein, Melucci (1996), following Pizzorno, proposes that collective identity is a condition for engaging in a cost/benefit analysis in the first place. It is only through a prior collective identity specifying ideals and norms that a calculation of harmful and beneficial actions becomes meaningful (Melucci 1996: 63). It is, however, unclear how this collective identity could be a description of a movement or a group identity if it already was present in an individual when the calculation of whether or not to participate in the movement was done. Saunders (2008) has similarly noticed that both for Melucci and the collective identity literature it is unclear whether the term applies to groups or movements as a whole. As a remedy, she proposes that one only refers to groups as having a collective identity, opening the possibility for describing several collective identities, possibly hostile towards each other, within one movement (Saunders 2008: 232).

As for a full definition of the term, there has yet to be reached a consensus (Snow and McAdam 2000: 42). There is agreement, however, that collective identity involves both a shared understanding of who ‘we’ are, and a conception of a common opponent (Melucci 1996: 73, Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94, Saunders 2008: 232). Della Porta and Diani (2006) distinguishes between two types of ‘we’ identification. First, there is the inclusive and flexible ‘we’ characterized by a lack of association with a specific social group, ideology or lifestyle. Groups adopting this identity will facilitate their external communication and make it easier for ordinary people to get involved (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 102). As

for the efficacy of such an identity Della Porta and Diani notes that: “Forms of allegiance which are not particularly intense or exclusive can, in certain contexts guarantee continuity of collective action.” (Ibid.: 98). Saunders, in her study of British environmentalism, on the other hand, found that such a non-comprehensive identity resulted in weak solidarity between members (2008: 237). The other ‘we’ identification is exclusive, which means that it harbors a narrow definition of who can and who can’t be a part of the group or movement. Such an approach will gather fewer, but could provide stronger incentives for participant actions (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 101-2). The need to strike a balance between these two identity concerns, between gathering the masses and motivating the core is a problem for several movements, including FIVH (Hansen 2007: 71).

In addition to a shared conception of a ‘we’, a social movement’s collective identity also harbors a shared understanding of who the opponents are. Saunders ties a weak ‘we’ identity to a lack of opponents with whom to form an effective contrast (2008: 237). According to Della Porta and Diani (2006) this is what differentiates a social movement from a consensus movement. Even though the latter has a shared understanding of the world, it has no conflictual element (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 22-3). They also note that lacking clearly defined opponents is a problem for the environmental movement in general (Ibid.: 102).

Social movement development

The question of movement identity is also tied to a movement’s life cycle. A common account of social movement development charts a pattern from protest, to formal organization to institutionalization (Snow and McAdam 2000: 56-7, Dryzek et al. 2003: 3). Offe (1990), in his tentative account of ‘the logic of institutional politics’, describes three stages of a social movement’s life cycle (Offe 1990: 246). The first, take-off, phase is characterized by radical demands and protest sentiment; a lack of distinctions between leadership and the rank-and-

file members; as well as an unclear picture of who 'the base' or 'the people' the movement represents really are. The subsequent stagnation phase sees the adoption of features of formal organization to prevent the movement from withering away. Funding and legal expertise is gathered, membership roles are formalized, and internal communication routinized. In the third institutionalization phase, increased resources and influence lure the movement toward closer government cooperation or integration (Ibid.: 236-45). Through this process, the movement identity, tied to its oppositional features, withers on the count of professionalization and bureaucratization (Offe 1990: 244, Burstein et al. 1995: 277, Andreassen 2006: 165). Several authors (Hjelmar 1996: 1-2, Dryzek et al. 2003: 3) have criticized this and similar stage theories. Hjelmar (1996) claims that such models make it difficult to explain the subsequent growth and effect of environmental organizations. Instead he proposes that environmental organizations embody two forms of political identity. The movement identity is guided by a practice of problematization, where the questioning of conventional politics and the redefinition of legitimate political causes are supplanted by bottom-up activities. Making social issues a part of the discussion is the goal of such a practice. The pressure group identity on the other hand is governed by a practice of effectiveness. Here the goal is influence and it is sought through a pragmatic *modus operandi* that adjusts after the existing power structures. These two identities are not exclusive, they can co-exist, and the dominant form may vary after historical period (Hjelmar 1996: 2-3).

Movement identity in Norway

In the Norwegian context the study of collective identity has been given comparatively little attention, a fate shared with most constructivist approaches (Bratland 2008). But this does not mean that identity as a topic has been omitted as a whole. When the Dryzek study refused to characterize Norwegian environmentalism as a social movement it worked from the assumption that all

environmental movements are radical. Based on an extensive survey of environmentalists and the general population, the Bergen Group instead argues that the core of Norwegian environmentalism from the start has been moderate (Grendstad et al. 2006: 85). Based on attitudes towards a range of issues environmentalists are a bit more left-leaning, ecological, post-material, and egalitarian, but on the whole “[...] fail to be distinguished from the general population in any profound way.” (Ibid.: 83). Moderation is not seen as an effect of institutionalization, but instead as rooted in two anomalies of Norwegian society which together make Norwegian environmentalism unique (Ibid.: 85). That is to say, both the environmentalists and the general population had attitudes in tune with both the first anomaly, called the state-friendly society, and the second, the local community perspective. The first anomaly fosters political moderation because the state is seen as an ally, not as an opponent. The second anomaly stems from the Norwegian experience of a self-reliant rural co-habitation with wild natural forces. It centers the environmental focus on “[...] the protection of man in nature [...]” (Grendstad et al. 2006: 2-3). Nature is not portrayed as a romantic ideal in isolation from man. Following Witoszek, the Norwegian view of human-nature interaction is instead described as pragmatic, where nature is both to be utilized and heeded, not isolated from human interference (Ibid.: 107). The local community perspective thus leads to ideological moderation.

Even if these anomalies characterize the environmental sector, the Bergen Group claimed it was “[...] barely possible to identify a common identity within the movement.” (Bortne et al. 2002: 44). For that, the environmental field is too broad. With regard to the identity of the individual organizations they note that the traditional DMOs used to “[...] put weight on affecting and ‘controlling’ that the members had ‘the right faith’”. Now, attitudes, to a larger degree are developed other places – *before* people approach the organizations.” (Strømsnes and Selle 1996a: 29). In addition the Bergen Group notes the relatively weak ties

found between members and the organizations: “Often, most of the members are completely passive, and barely connected to the decision-making structures of the organizations.” (Strømsnes and Selle 1996b: 283). Other than these and similar remarks, the Bergen Group does not attempt to describe identities specific to the different organizations. Their foremost concern is the environmental field as a whole, alternatively its sub-sectors, not single organizations. Identity is here assessed primarily from an aggregate of survey responses of attitudes, not from the perspective of individual understanding. This has yielded firm insights into the character of Norwegian environmentalism, but it omits the role identity can have within the operation of individual organizations.

One study that explicitly touches upon this question is Kapstad’s (2009) investigation of NU, NNV’s youth division. She characterizes Norwegian environmentalism as an important arena for identity construction (Kapstad 2000: 79). Given their occasional utilization of civil disobedience, NU, along with Bellona, is regarded as the most radical of the Norwegian environmental organizations (Bortne et al. 2002: 24). Kapstad describes how the question of identity has become problematic for NU activists: “In NU we see how today’s identity construction is based on a choice of who one does *not* want to be.” (Kapstad 2000: 95). In her account there seems to be an identity ambivalence at work within the youth organization. The NU activists do not want to be associated with the stereotypical NU ‘uniform’ consisting of “[...] Icelandic sweaters, army boots, and Palestinian shawls [...]” (Ibid.: 92). Through their protest actions this image of NU activists has been spread across the country by the media. The activists are not afraid to wear the uniform, however, only afraid that others might mistake their outfit for an authentic expression when they in fact wear it ironically. Thus, they are wearing clothes signifying a specific identity, while they at the same time express a wish for not being pigeonholed as ‘one of those’. Kapstad claims that:

“[...] the stereotyping and the creation of an image of a typical NU member is not done from outside but on the basis of internal conditions, for despite the desire of the members to liberate themselves from a style [...] we nevertheless witness how NU and the local group still recruit members on the basis of the image from which they wish to distance themselves.” (Ibid.: 92)

In this way, the image they want to get away from is not the result of negative external campaigns, it is an image the organization itself has created, and still uses. Interestingly, Kapstad does not tie this act of identity distancing to anything specifically pertaining to the NU identity, such as a perceived toxicity of the organization's radicalness. Nor does she try to interpret the situation within the specific Norwegian context, as described by the Bergen Group. Instead, Kapstad ties the phenomenon to a general problem individuals have within postmodern society, where the ideal is not to keep one's identity stable, but instead to keep one's options open by avoiding to fixate on one identity (Ibid.: 94). Thus it is the discomfort of feeling 'typical' that explains the activists need to distance themselves. The notion of 'typical' is here used in the sense of typical for a small sub-group. Distancing themselves from a typical sub-group identity does not mean returning to a neutral identity, it means rather to keep the NU identity while holding it at a distance. In this way Kapstad makes identity an individual question, not something collective. Thus she fails to investigate how an identity distancing could be connected to the collective NU identity itself, or to the Norwegian public's reaction to such an alternative identity. A further omission is the lack of discussion of identity framing, and how identities are employed strategically. The former issue will be treated in the following sub-chapter.

2.4 Frame Theory

Frame theory is a theoretical approach that arose in the 1980s, and is now a central part of SMT. First seen as a constructivist alternative to explaining

collective action in terms of rationalist models, it is now often merged with the RM or political process paradigms (Polletta and Ho 2006: 3). Frame theory disputes the notion, common in earlier theories that grievances are given or pre-existing (Tarrow 2011: 26). It seeks to describe how social movements, through frames, actively interpret their contexts, aims and interests, in order to motivate collective action. As such frame theory attempts to provide a terminology to describe not only a central aspect of how the DMOs understand their relation to the people, but also how frames are used to shape movement identity. According to Snow and Benford, collective action frames are defined as “[...] emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs that inspire meaning and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns.” (Benford 1997: 416). These sets of beliefs are composed of three core framing tasks: An articulation of a problem (diagnostic frame), a proposed solution (prognostic frame), and an encouragement to participate (motivational frame) (Snow and Benford 2000: 615-18). Effective frames are those that integrate all these three elements (Polletta and Ho 2006: 3). In contrast to similar terms, such as ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’, frames are agentive, i.e., they are actively shaped by movement participants. This can happen either through a discursive process; as a result of strategic deliberation; or as a product of conflict (Snow and Benford 2000: 623-7). In order for a social movement to grow, spread its message, and increase in power, it is not enough to have a frame. Movements also need to convince people to join. This process is by Snow et al. (1986) described as frame alignment, and it can occur in four different ways. Frame bridging refers to how two or more ideologically similar movement actors (e.g. two DMOs), previously unconnected start to cooperate. While frame amplification describes the process where support is gathered through the clarification or reinvigoration of a frame, frame extension refers to how movement actors enlarge their concern to include interests not directly related to the main goal of the movement. The last frame alignment process is called frame transformation. It is a reaction to a situation

where old values “[...] may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals [...]” (Snow et al. 1986: 473). Thus the movement’s frames must be transformed by planting new values, while jettisoning old meanings (Ibid.: 467-75). In this way we can see that: “[...] identity constructions are an inherent feature of the framing process.” (Snow and Benford 2000: 631-2). Through framing, identities can be created or modified, aspects hidden or amplified. Tarrow (2011) notes that the best known identity framing was done in the civil rights struggles in the 1960s. Martin Luther King, jr. and the SCLC were “[...] working to create more generally a new collective identity among Southern blacks [...]” in order to combat the negative stereotypes then associated with African-Americans (Tarrow 2011: 151). Similar to the process of frame alignment Snow and McAdam (2000) have described how personal and collective identities are aligned. Their examples revolve around how the identity of individuals are either amplified, consolidated, extended or transformed to fit the collective identity of the movement (Snow and McAdam 2000: 49-53). Interestingly, they are only concerned with how individual identities adapt to collective identities. There doesn't seem to be any systematic treatment in the literature on frames of how movements strategically transform their own identities to try to shift or broaden their appeal. This despite the fact that such a process is deemed of high importance. Della Porta and Diani (2006), for example, notes that the story of movements is “[...] the story of their members’ ability to impose certain images of themselves, and to counter attempts by dominant groups to denigrate their aspirations to be recognized as different.” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 106). The lacking systematic treatment notwithstanding, a couple of observations is worth highlighting. For Della Porta and Diani an important part of identity work involves challenging negative stereotypes (2006: 107). Taylor and Whittier claims that for sub-ordinate groups, like the lesbian-feminist movement, giving a devaluated identity a new positive value, requires the withdrawal from the values of mainstream society (1992:

111). The environmental movement, however, hardly fits the description of a sub-ordinate group. Polletta and Jaspers, on the other hand, point out that organizations often build their movement identity on a previously extant collective identity, independent of the movement (2001: 291). Instead of creating new values, on this view, frames can also be adopted after the political and cultural landscape (Polletta and Ho 2006: 5).

2.5 New Questions

This review has shown that the literature on the relation between the Norwegian environmental DMOs and ‘the people’ has mainly been focused on assessing whether NEM conforms to the definition of a social movement or a *folkebevegelse*. The fact that neither definition is found to be a fitting description poses several questions: How should the relation between ‘the people’ and the Norwegian environmental DMOs be assessed? How far has Norwegian environmentalism progressed into a dual-organizational society? What kind of movement is the environmental movement if it is not a *folkebevegelse*? The identity dimension of the relation between the DMOs and the people has been given less attention. The Bergen Group does characterize the sector as moderate, both politically and ideologically, but they focus on the environmental field as a whole, thus omitting the role identity can play within single organizations. Kapstad partly remedies this lack by describing how NU activists distance themselves from stereotypes of the organization. Nevertheless, she ties this identity distancing to a general problem individuals have in post-modern society, instead of connecting it to anything specific about the identity of the organization itself or the specific context it operates in. In the case of frame theory we described a terminology for frame alignment processes and identity construction processes. The focus, however, is more on how individuals adapt to collective identities, than on how collective identities are strategically shaped.

Chapter 3: Method

In the introduction I described this thesis as an explorative, interpretive and descriptive study of the understanding of three Norwegian environmental DMOs. In chapter 3.1 I will argue that a qualitative approach is best suited for such a study as it is specifically designed for capturing how people give meaning to and understand the world around them. I will also claim that a semi-structured interview form enables both directing the interviews toward specific topics as well as allowing the capturing of in-depth answers. Moving on to chapter 3.2 I will focus on the three main facets of the interview process: I will describe the reasoning behind using purposive and snowball sampling for the selection of informants, the preparation of the interview guide, and the unfolding of the interview sessions. In chapter 3.3 I will explain how the statements from the informants were transcribed, analyzed, and presented. I will put emphasis on my attempt to describe a shared narrative within each organization. In chapter 3.4 I will address the issue of the analysis' credibility by describing how this thesis relates to three common criteria of credibility for qualitative research: transparency, coherence, and communicability.

3.1 Qualitative Method

As stated in the introduction, in this thesis I aim to provide an interpretation of the organizations' understanding of their relation to 'the people', from the perspective of informants within the organizations. For this purpose it is appropriate to adopt a qualitative approach. The quantitative alternative of survey questionnaires offers a convenient way to access people's beliefs and opinions, and the rigid and predetermined questions make it possible to quantify and compare answers. Because of these qualities, however, surveys are ill-equipped to capture the broader context of and meanings relevant to the interview subject

(Flick 2015: 10-2). Since surveys rely on standardized questions there is little room to introduce new topics of discussion. To ensure standardization, surveys often clarify the meaning of the questions (Singleton Jr. and Straits 2012: 87), whereas the aim in qualitative research is to provide the interview subject with the freedom to emphasize what is relevant for her (Flick 2015: 12). Neither do surveys provide sufficient opportunity for the interaction between interviewer and interviewee, specifically in the form of asking situation-dependent follow-up questions. These features are necessary to capture the context and the broader processes of reasoning involved in the phenomenon of understanding. Surveys, then, form an insufficient basis for an open, explorative approach of the informants' understanding, but would be a valuable asset for verifying the findings of such an approach.

Qualitative research, on the other hand, is specifically designed to examine how individuals see and experience the world. The approach is “[...] used to explore new phenomena and to capture individuals’ thoughts, feelings, or interpretations of meaning and process.” (Given 2008: xxix). It stresses the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and how the context shapes and constrains research. Qualitative approaches seek to answer questions that underline how social experience is created and given meaning (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 8). The notion of ‘understanding’ is a central concept of interpretive research within the qualitative field (Bhattacharya 2008: 464). The phenomenological-hermeneutical tradition stresses the social and situational aspect of understanding. Merleau-Ponty highlights how the body is a vital site of understanding (1962: 144). More pertinent for our purposes is the notion stressed by Heidegger and Gadamer that understanding is a social phenomenon involving shared norms, rules and practices as well as a shared understanding of the world (Heidegger 2006: 126-30). It is primarily through our family, society and situation our understanding of the world is shaped (Gadamer 2004: 278).

The interview form is an apt choice when the goal is study people's understanding of specific phenomena (Widerberg 2001: 17). Capturing the informants' understanding, however, makes certain requirements of the interview method. It has to be open enough to allow for long reflective in-depth answers that could provide descriptions, explanations, contextualizations, and reasons that could form the basis for a contextual interpretation. It also has to be directed enough to address the topic of interest. The semi-structured interview method provides for both these concerns. According to Flick (2015) a semi-structured interview relies on an interview guide with a number of questions covering a broad range of issues. The interviewer can deviate from the sequence of questions, and also change the formulation if required. The questions should initiate a dialogue between interviewer and informant, and the informants are expected to reply freely and extensively (Flick 2015: 140). Since the DMO-informants have a close relationship with the subject matter, the interviews could also be referred to as a kind of expert interviews (see, e.g., Flick Ibid.: 141).

3.2 Interviews

Because the concern of this thesis is how the DMO-informants understand their relation to 'the people', the main source of information relied upon is interviews of informants from the three selected organizations. To supplement these interviews I have also, to a limited extent, relied on official documents and key texts which are available through the respective organizations' webpages. These supplementary texts have not been systematically analyzed, but have assisted in and provided context for the interpretation of the informants' understanding.

Selection of interview subjects

The selection of interview subjects can be characterized as a mixture of purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling means seeking

out interview subjects that can illustrate the features and aspects we are interested in (Silverman 2005: 129). Central for the selection process was the desire to interpret how the DMOs operate now, not how they operated 5 or 50 years ago. I therefore only attempted to contact staff or organizational personnel working within the organizations at the time of the interviews. It was also important that the interview subjects had some familiarity with the problematic of the thesis, preferably having worked on strategy, member support, public outreach etc. within their organization. Summarized, I had three requirements of the informants: They had to be presently active; knowledgeable about the subject matter; and willing to participate. To find people who fit this description I used snowball sampling, which relies on using primary contacts as steppingstones to find new potential informants (Atkinson and Flint 2004: 1044-5). Before starting the first interview I already had one contact in both NNV and FOLVS; in the case of FIVH I had to start with a 'cold call'. After making contact with the first informant in each organization and interviewing them, I was referred to one or several potential informants who could fit my criteria. The new informants, in turn, referred me to other potential contacts. This snowballing method proved efficient, as it provided the advantage of introducing me to informants who were highly familiar with the topic and who were willing to talk about it at length. A more stringent interview selection processes was not needed because the aim of the thesis is to explore and describe the understanding of the relation between DMOs and the people, not to portray a representative picture of that understanding. Using the snowballing method, however, could limit the views to one wing or sector of the organization, one example of what e.g. Atkinson & Flint refer to as the gatekeeper problem (Ibid.: 1045). In my case, this was not an issue, however, as I was referred to contacts from different sectors of the organizations, who offered a broad variety of opinions.

Except for the three first contacts in each organization, the potential informants were approached in a similar way by short, to the point e-mails. In these e-mails I

first briefly presented myself, my institute and my project, before stating that I had been referred to speak to them by other members of their organization. I stated that I wanted to interview them in connection to this thesis about their perspective on their organization's politics, strategy, and relation to the public.

In total 16 persons were contacted, 12 of whom responded, five from NNV, four from FIVH and three from FOLVS; all of the respondents were interviewed. From NNV and FIVH all the informants worked at their respective main offices. With regard to FOLVS the informants either worked for the organization, or had a high function in their organizations voluntary sector. Within qualitative research the question of how many informants to interview is difficult to answer (Becker 2012: 15, Flick and Salomon 2012: 27). Flick & Salomon (2012) state that the answer depends on several issues and the researcher must balance between inside and outside determinants. From the inside of the study, the number of informants should be determined by the dimensions that are the basis of intended comparisons. They suggest including at least two cases for each dimension (Flick & Salomon 2012: 27). I will argue that 12 informants spread out over three organizations are sufficient for my purposes, as a minimum of three informants from each organization yielded a sufficient amount of variety. As for the outside determinants, Flick & Salomon list both time constraints and resources as important (Ibid.). In this project, the time limit in particular set a restriction on how many informants I could include in the study. Further, given the small size of the organizations, the number of informants who fit the three criteria was limited, making it difficult to include more participants.

Interview guide

In preparation for the interviews I wrote an interview guide with six main questions and 31 optional follow-up questions.¹² The main topics were developed

¹² See Appendix p. 141.

with the main problematic of the thesis in mind and concerned the organizations' strategy, information work, and overall relation to members and the public. The guide formed a loose backbone for the interview sessions; a fixed point to draw the informants back to if their answers became too meandering. During the run of interviews some of the questions were slightly sharpened, but on the whole the interview guide remained roughly the same throughout. The questions in themselves provided the broad outline of how I wanted the conversations to proceed. They were organized thematically and were formulated with the hope of provoking substantial answers as well as avoiding quick replies. They were not theoretical questions, but were designed with the aim of making the informant reflect on their organization's activities, strategies and priorities. It is important to stress that I did not want them to focus on their own participation in the same activities. Instead I wanted for them to make the organization the focal center, not themselves. The aim was to make them reflect, not theorize. Firstly, because theorizing is more abstract it is more difficult to do on the spot, but more importantly because what is under investigating are not theoretical positions, but operative understandings of their relation to the people.

Interview sessions

The interviews were conducted between February 2014 and March 2015. Such a long time span was neither optimal nor by design, but occurred due to a prolonged illness. The relatively stable operating circumstances of the organizations mean it should not have any great effect on the results of the thesis. All the interviews, except for one, were held face-to-face. Six interviews were held at the offices of the informants' organizations; five were held at quiet locales, cafes, study halls or the informants' home, at the request of the informants; and one informant was interviewed per telephone.

Before the interviews the informants were asked if they consented to the interview sessions being taped, something all agreed to. They were told that they

could speak freely as they would be anonymized, and that their answers could end up in the thesis. The informants were not asked to represent their organizations, but to provide their own views on topics concerning it. This was also made clear to them through the first question, which did not ask them for their personal motivation in joining the organization, but instead asked them to tell about their role in the organization. With that as a starting point, I directed the interview in a specific direction, and I stood free to draw on their first answer for elaborations or to go back to interview guide. Adhering to an open ended line of questioning, the interview guide was not followed slavishly, but I tried to get the informants to cover the main topics of the guide. Save for one exception, the sessions lasted between 45 and 120 minutes, the majority of which lasted about an hour. The exception was a telephone interview that was cut short after 25 minutes. A lack of face-to-face interaction and distracting background elements cut the informant's answers to a shorter length than desirable. The face-to-face interviews on the other hand allowed for a closer rapport between interviewer and informant, which facilitated longer responses from the informants, and better follow-up questions from me based on the long responses. All the interviews were held in Norwegian. I did not collect additional material from the informants, apart from the recording of the interviews. No sensitive or private information was collected, and the participants have been anonymized. In the analysis they are referred to as Informants 1-12.

3.3 Analysis and Presentation

After transcribing the interviews I read through them and got an overview of the material for each organization. Since the interviews were semi-structured different themes were present at different parts of the interview transcripts, which also meant that some re-organization of the themes was needed. For this purpose one separate analysis spread sheet for each organization was used. The analysis

entailed breaking the transcribed interviews into bits and reassembling them in a thematically coherent way. What I looked for was recurring themes, as well as statements which through emphasis indicated importance. This was done organically from the material itself without imposing the framework of the interview guide or other categorical schemata. This produced two effects. First, the thematic categories of the spread sheets turned out differently than those of the interview guide, even if there were some overlap. Second, the spread sheets for the different organizations did not have the same categories, though you could also find an overlap here. Thus assembled the spread sheets formed the starting point for the presentation.

One alternative for presenting the themes is the polyphonic method of representation, which stresses the differences between individuals. Bate (1997) claims that a polyphonic approach is ideally suited in the case of organizations because they “[...] are by their very nature pluralistic and multifocal, and made up of a rich diversity of intersecting dialects, idioms and professional jargons.” (Bate 1997: 1167). This is undoubtedly true, within organizations differing opinions do abound. More interesting for the purpose of this thesis, however, is the understanding shared among the informants. My assumption is that organizations as specialized as the Norwegian environmental DMOs not only employ a fairly homogenous group of workers, these workers are also exposed to the same tasks, challenges, and rewards, in short, the same reality in the same organization. Because of this the experiences of the informants should show strong similarities. Through focusing on the shared understanding embedded in the recurring issues, examples, terms and phrases from the interviews of the informants it is possible to construct what Carr calls a shared communal narrative structure for each organization (1991: 150). Carr claims that a story about the ‘we’ of a social group can be told by an individual on behalf of the group. Such a story, however, “[...] must be shared if it is to be constitutive of a group’s existence and activity.” (Ibid.: 156).

By piecing together the informants' statements it is possible to present a narrative for each organization. Through the extensive use of direct quotes I could not only describe the topics of interest, but also illustrate the coherence between the informants' statements as they discuss the same phenomenon. This narrative does not have to be monolithic or show no sign of contradiction, there is room for divergence where it is central, but the focus is on commonalities. In this process I went back and forth between single statements and the whole of the narrative, letting the whole and the part refine and illuminate the meaning of each other, a process that took shape of what Gadamer refers to as the hermeneutic circle (2004: 268-72). This did not lead to removing statements that went counter to the main point, rather it facilitated pointing out discrepancies between the informants. This process also involved both describing the explicit level of the informants' understanding, as well as making inferences based on their statements to their implicit understanding. Where I found it informative I have also added quotes from other sources external to the interviews.

In a first draft I attempted to present the analysis in three chapters one for each organization. After discovering that the analysis of all three organizations coalesced around three main topics (participation, role and stereotype) I chose to re-organize the analysis chapters after each of these topics in order to better illustrate the similarities and differences between each organization. An integral part of the presentation was the translation of the informants' statements from Norwegian to English. In the translations I tried to keep as close to the original meaning and structure of the sentences without sacrificing readability.

3.4 The Credibility of the Analysis

Rubin and Rubin (1995) state that the standards of validity employed in quantitative studies are not directly transferable to qualitative studies. Instead, the credibility of qualitative research is judged by three factors, its communicability,

consistency-coherence, and transparency (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 85). By communicability, Rubin and Rubin mean that the analysis should be recognizable to the informants and to the readers: “The richness of detail, abundance of evidence, and vividness of the text help convince those who have never been in the field that this material is real.” (Ibid.: 91). I will not claim any literary merit, but through the extensive use of quotes, and through keeping close to the source material, the criterion of richness of details and abundance of evidence should be satisfied.

Regarding the second criterion, checking the consistency both between informants and between the statements of one single informant is important in order to assure the reliability of the informants’ claims (Ibid.: 87). As my interest primarily is the informants’ own understanding, it would make little sense to question the validity of one informant’s statement because it differs from that of another. When that is said, as I already have described in the outline above, describing coherence between the informants is an important aspect of the analysis.

The third criterion, transparency, means that the process of data collection and analysis is clear to the reader, with possible biases addressed by the researcher (Ibid.: 85). The sampling method has already been discussed in chapters 3.2 with regard to bias. Also important is the question of my own role as a researcher and the interaction with the informants in the interview session. Seidman (2006) states that the interaction between the data gatherer and the participants is inherent in the nature of interviewing. No matter how much effort is put into minimizing the effect of the interviewer, the interviewer still forms a part of the interviewing picture. (Seidman 2006: 22). According to Lincoln & Guba (1985), however, the in-depth interview, as opposed to quantitative approaches, is characterized by the recognition and affirmation of the instrument, the human interviewer. Instead of decrying the fact that the instrument used to gather data

affects this process, the human interviewer has the potential of being a smart, adaptable, and flexible instrument who can respond to situations with skill and understanding (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 107, here in Seidman 2006: 23). The interviewer must recognize that the meaning is, to some degree, a function of the interaction between participant and interviewer (Ibid.). During the interview sessions I was conscious of my own role in the meaning creating process that an interview represents. Though sympathetic to the aim of the environmental movement I was careful not to express any personal opinions on the matters under discussion. Instead I adopted the role of attentive listener. I tried to let the informants speak at length without interruption to let them develop their arguments and descriptions.

Chapter 4: The Organizations

The history of Norwegian environmentalism is commonly divided into several developmental stages (Gundersen 1996, Grendstad et al. 2006, Berntsen 2011). The three organizations under study, NNV, FIVH, and FOLVS, each arose during a different stage. NNV was established in 1914 during the period referred to as classical environmentalism, characterized by a scientific outlook and a focus on conservation issues. FIVH was founded in 1973 during the heyday of Norwegian environmentalism, which saw an orientation towards grassroots organizing, populism, and politics. In the 1980s and 1990s environmentalism saw first a decline in participation; upon its resurgence it had become more professionalized, and its attention had shifted to local and single issues. When FOLVS was founded in 2009 its focus on one local issue conformed to the latter part, but in terms of organizational structure it takes a more grassroots approach.

In this chapter I will primarily provide an overview of the three organizations' development and organizational structure. In chapter 4.1 I will describe NNV's transformation from an elitist institution to a grassroots organization. In the case of FIVH, my focus will primarily be on their early years of operation where the issues of education, lifestyle changes and moralism were central. FOLVS, in comparison to the other two DMOs is smaller both in size and scope. Its singular focus is to keep the LVS-area free from oil. Chapter 4.3 will therefore revolve around the battle of Lofoten which FOLVS is enmeshed in, in addition to describing the short history of the organization itself.

4.1 Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV)

Norges Naturvernforbund (The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature) is the oldest and second largest environmental organization in Norway. According to their statutes they work for “[...] a society where the people live in harmony with nature. A society where the foundation and manifold of life is secured for future generations, and where nature’s intrinsic value form the basis for increasing people’s respect for and love of life and landscape.” (NNV 2013). Originally concerned with classical environmentalism in the form of nature conservation (*naturvern*), NNV’s work now covers a broad spectrum of issues with a focus on conservation, climate change, energy and transportation. The following account will chart the main outline of NNV’s historical development, drawing attention to its popular engagements and organizational structure. It will mainly draw upon two secondary sources, Berntsen (2011) and Gundersen (1996).

History

Recently celebrating its centenary, NNV traces its lineage back to 1914 when the first statutes of *Landsforening for Naturfredning i Norge* were adopted, and the first local group, *Østlandske kretsforening*, was founded. It wasn’t properly constituted until 1916, however, after having met their own requirement of organizing at least three local groups. Motivated by historical, scientific and esthetic ends NNV’s work during the first years was on conservation issues, especially on waterfall protection and the establishment of national parks. The latter aim proved problematic due to the organization’s low popular appeal in a time when conservation efforts in general were perceived to be a scientific elite phenomenon. Membership levels before WWII didn’t reach a thousand people, and the member base, dominated by scientists, army officials and officers, showed low social stratification (Berntsen 2011: 109).

The groundwork for a broader appeal was laid in 1936 when the idea of conservation was extended to also include social ends. Conservation efforts should from then on also seek to preserve areas for common people. Because of a near total breakdown of the organization during the war, however, the change had little impact until the post-war period, when NNV started to gain influence in corporative circles. Its contributions were considerable in the work that led up to the 1954 law on environmental protection, which opened up for national parks, and to a lesser extent the 1957 law on outdoor recreation (*friluftsliv*), which guaranteed *Allemannsretten*, the right of free passage and use of the wilderness (Berntsen 2011).

After several name changes¹³ NNV got its current name in 1962, the same year as an extensive democratic reshuffling process was initiated (Sørensen 1996: 138-9). The organization was still more of a top-down initiative, and bore little resemblance to other established grassroots organizations in the Norwegian labor, health and temperance movements. But, whereas the organization previously had functioned more as an information channel for experts, NNV was now at least recalibrated for the purpose of mobilizing the masses (Gundersen 1996: 43). Throughout the 1960s and the early 70s the organization would continue to grow and be more politicized. In 1968 their youth division *Natur og Ungdom* (Nature and Youth) was founded, and through the European Nature Conservation year in 1970 NNV saw a boost in members and funding as well as a strengthening of the secretariat (Ibid.: 54).

1970 was also the year of *Mardøla-aksjonen*, which Gundersen calls the breakthrough of the Norwegian environmental movement (Ibid.: 55). It marked the first time both for the use of civil disobedience in the context of

¹³ NNV has been known as *Landsforening for Naturfredning i Norge* (1914-1936); *Landsforbundet for Naturfredning i Norge* (1936-1951); *Landsforbundet for Naturvern i Norge* (1951-1962); and *Norges Naturvernforbund* (1962-). It is also commonly referred to as *Naturvernforbundet*.

environmental protest in Norway, as well as the first alliance between locals and organized environmentalists led by the now defunct (*snm*). NNV, who long had worked for the preservation of waterfalls, supported the viewpoints of the protesters who wanted to stop the construction of the dam, but did not support their means of civil disobedience (Berntsen 2011: 165-7). A similar pattern was to be seen a decade later in *Alta-aksjonene* in 1979 and 1981 against the damming of the Alta waterfalls. An independent people's action was formed,¹⁴ civil disobedience was used, and NNV chose not to be directly involved with the protest, this time preferring to pursue the case through the judicial system (Ibid.: 250-1).

NNV's already long held close ties to the state was also apparent through its active role in the establishment of *Miljøverndepartementet* (The Ministry of Environmental Protection)¹⁵ in 1972 (Bortne et al. 2002: 48-9). Even though NNV already the next year dissociated itself from the Ministry, and criticized it for being beholden to a growth and preservation (*vekst og vern*) ideology, the bonds between the two have continued to be close. The transition of personnel from NNV to new positions in the expanding environmental administration meant that strong personal connections tied the two together and shaped the development of both (Gundersen 1996: 59). NNV's close ties to the corporative sector through their frequent participation in public councils and committees, and in departmental hearings is still a central feature of the organization (Bortne et al. 2002: 50).

After both *Alta-aksjonen* and an attempt at stopping oil exploration north of the 62 parallel ended in defeat, NNV, along with the rest of the environmental movement, experienced a downturn in the late 70s and early 80s (Berntsen 2011: 285). This was soon changed, however, when new issues connected with climate change, the ozone layer, nuclear proliferation and acid rain raised the awareness

¹⁴ *Folkeaksjon mot utbygging av Alta-Kautokeinovassdraget*.

¹⁵ Since 2013 it has been known as *Klima- og Miljødepartementet*.

of environmental problems on a global level, and contributed to a new rise in popularity for NNV. At their top in 1991 the organization had 40.000 members (Sørensen 1996: 139).

Today NNV's work is characterized by a close cooperation with the public sector on both local and national conservation issues, often utilizing laws they themselves have put into place. Their focus has also incorporated climate change, especially visible through the fight against gas plants in the 1990s and the attempts to shield the LVS area from oil exploration beginning in the 2000s. In the latter case, NNV's participation took on a familiar pattern. NNV did not take part in the, this time, limited civil disobedience, but in addition to supporting the issue at a national level, it was instrumental in the formation of FOLVS – a local based people's action (*folkeaksjon*) against oil exploration in LVS.¹⁶ FOLVS is an independent organization, as Trædal (2013) notes, in his study of NNV, but he nonetheless includes it as “[...] an important source of climate-related activism within NNV.” (Trædal 2013: 53). According to Trædal, NNV is closely involved in the operation of FOLVS to the point that they are obscuring their own involvement lest it hinders them in engaging people through proper NNV activity. In other words this is yet another example of NNV channeling popular mobilization efforts into separate actions. By his informants this was seen to increase mobilization potential by lowering the barriers to entry into activism, preventing NNV's other, more contentious policies to deter activism (Ibid.: 54).

In recent years NNV has been affected by falling membership numbers and poor economic management. In 1998 the organization was rescued from bankruptcy by the ministry (Bortne et al. 2002: 51). And in 2007 the organization was again in financial troubles which hampered the organizations activity (Trædal 2013: 36). Their current financial status is said to be sound; their funding mainly stemming from the Ministry and from membership dues.

¹⁶ See chapter 4.3 for more information on FOLVS.

Organization

Even though their membership level has seen a continuous small rise the last decade, to 21.212 in 2014, it is still only half the size it was in 1991. Recently surpassed by FIVH in terms of members, NNV still has the most extensive local network, by far. It has 17 regional groups (*fylkeslag*) and 84 active local groups (*lokallag*) at the municipal level, many of whom are characterized by high activity. Their secretariat, with its main office in Oslo, with offices in Bergen, Kragerø, Trondheim, and Vesterålen, employs 43 people, working 35 person-years. As mentioned NNV started its transition towards being democratically organized in 1963 when all members were given voting rights in the organization. Their current structure of the National Convention (*Landsmøtet*), the National Board (*Landsstyret*) and the Central Board (*Sentralstyret*) was not incorporated until 1991, however (Sørensen 1996: 139). NNV's highest governing body is the National Convention, which meets on a bi-annual basis. It is in charge of handling their governing documents as well as electing the National Board and the Central Board. At the National Convention local groups have one representative each, whereas the regional groups, *Natur og Ungdom* (NU, NNV's youth division), and *Miljøagentene* (NNV's children's club), all are represented according to their member count. Between their sessions the organization is led by the National Board, which meets four times a year and handles budgetary issues and matters of principal importance. It is led by the Central Board with its seven members, whereas the staff, NU, *Miljøagentene*, *Regnskogsfondet* and each of the regional groups have one member each. In addition to leading the National Board, the Central Board is in charge of daily operations as well as the direct supervision of the secretariat (NNV 2015a).

4.2 Framtiden i Våre Hender (FIVH)

Framtiden i våre hender (Future in our Hands) is a central actor within the Norwegian environmental sector. With 24.884 members it has recently surpassed NNV and is now Norway's largest environmental DMO. According to its statutes FIVH's overarching goals are "[...] global justice, ecological balance and a solution to world poverty, that makes it possible for every person on earth to live a dignified life." (FIVH 2014). Concretely this manifests itself through a wide focus area ranging from personal consumption, via corporate responsibility to a fair global economy. Regarding the environment specifically it eschews engagement with the topic of conservation in Norway, instead prioritizing climate change related issues.

In the following account I will mostly focus on FIVH's early years, for two reasons. First, because the early years was when the central tenets of the organization were debated and started to congeal. Second, because this is a period the informants frequently use as a contrast point for their present understanding of FIVH. Of most interest to us is the conception of FIVH as a movement, its focus on education and having a broad popular appeal as well as critiques directed against FIVH for being moralistic. This period has been studied by Hansen (2007), whose work will be the most central source I draw upon in the following.

History

The organization takes its name from a 1972 book by the advertising executive Erik Dammann: *Fremtiden i våre hender*.¹⁷ An improbable hit it decried the injustice inherent in a world system where resources abounded for the rich while

¹⁷ An attentive reader might have detected a slight difference in spelling in the two names. The slight modernizing change from '*Fremtiden*' to '*Framtiden*' was done in 1977 when FIVH also went from calling itself a 'people's action' to a 'movement' (Hansen 2007: 16).

50 million people died of hunger and malnutrition each year. The book instead advocated a new lifestyle centered on a drastic reduction in consumption, and a more equitable sharing of resources (Dammann 1972: 17, 115). Two years later, at a legendary inaugural meeting in Nadderudhallen attended by 3.000 participants, a people's action (*folkeaksjon*) was formed based on the ideas in the book. The action went under the full name of *Fremtiden i våre hender, en folkeaksjon for en ny livsstil og fordeling av verdens ressurser* (Future in our hands, a people's action for a new lifestyle and sharing of the world's resources).

In its initial phase FIVH differed from the traditional environmental organizations, notably NNV, in both form and content. In form it was conceived of as a movement of participants (*deltagere*) and not as a traditional organization with members. When it comes to content FIVH's focus during the early years was broader than that of the traditional environmental organizations. FIVH's overall concern, the equitable sharing of resources, was an issue that connected over-consumption at home with poverty reduction abroad. But even though a concern for resource use and consumption were more than just tangentially related to environmental problems, FIVH distanced itself from the traditional environmental movement. They were not active in the energy/resource debate at home, central to the environmental movement at the time (Hansen 2007: 103).¹⁸ Instead Dammann (1972) criticized the growing interest in environmentalism "[...] if it is based on narrow self-interest, instead of on an interest for the individual humans all over the world. The problem of environmental protection/aid is not an either/or, but a both/and." (Dammann 1972: 114-5). Opinions differ on whether FIVH in its formative years could be called an environmental organization at all. Whereas Berntsen places the early activity of FIVH in the category of environmentalism (2011: 219), Steinar Lem (1996), a former spokesperson for FIVH, claims that it was founded as a reaction to abundance and materialism and that, initially, it was not an environmental movement (Lem

¹⁸ See chapter 4.1 on NNV.

1996: 163). Indeed, Hansen (2007) claims that in the first ten years of FIVH's existence the crossover points with the environmental movement were few and far between. She claims it was not until the 1980s that the goals of solidarity and environmentalism were drawn together generally and for FIVH in particular (Hansen 2007: 102). Since then FIVH has increased its environmental portfolio considerably, and the social and environmental goals are now put on equal standing (Løken 1999: 75).

Already from its inception FIVH saw education and information dissemination as vital tools to wake the populace from its materialist slumber. The establishment of their headquarter as *informasjonssenteret* (the info-center) showcased their intent. According to Hansen it was "[...] the most vital component of the whole movement." (2007: 27). It was not only where FIVH was run it was also the place where their information and attitude campaigns were shaped, and where their magazine and newsletters were edited.

As a self-identified movement with far-reaching aims FIVH sought to appeal to the broadest public possible. In the words of Erik Dammann: "A consequence of us aiming for a movement that in the end will encompass a majority of the people, is that the movement has to be as open as possible. A member organization can never count on reaching such a scope." (Cited in Hansen 2007: 33). Important in this regard was the attempt to appear popular (*folkelig*). Not only did derivatives of the word 'popular' show up in their initial name (*folkeaksjon*); a newsletter (*Folkeaksjonisten*); and a magazine (*Folkevelt*), FIVH also actively attempted to proselytize through popular channels such as housewives magazines (Ibid.: 94). The aim was to recruit the economically average population of Norway as participants of the movement, not as members of an organization. The important thing wasn't a formal connection or paying membership fees, but that they followed the core values (*verdigrunnlaget*) of the organization.

As long as they adhered to these values the participants were free to express themselves as they wished (Løken 1999: 76). And at their height in 1982 they counted 26.500 participants as well as claiming to have the support of 10% of the Norwegian people, at that time 280.000 people (Hansen 2007: 30). But, even if they intended to address the majority of the people, the economic middle, in reality their supporters had higher income and education levels than the average population. Hansen claims therefore that there was a wedge between the popular ideal and the actual social foundation of FIVH (Ibid.: 94).

FIVH's focus on the individual, its concern with consumption and attitude change, as well as its attempt at the creation of a new lifestyle were not uncontroversial. Their strategy was from an early stage "[...] accused of being unpolitical, naïve and moralistic." (Ibid.: 53). The initial paucity of attention on the structural or political level was motivated by a belief that the politicians wouldn't act until they saw a substantial change in the people first. But, already in 1976, after having been confronted with the charge of lacking an analysis of the economic and political system of power, FIVH veered in a more political direction. From then on FIVH to a larger degree attempted to concretize its aims into political goals (Ibid.: 45).

Moralism, however, wasn't only a source of criticism, but also played a positive role in the internal cohesion of FIVH. The high ethical demands put on the movement's participants to reduce their consumption did alienate even active participants along with outsiders (Ibid.: 83). But moralism also functioned as a glue that held the organization together. By uniting the participants around a shared ethical stance, moralism became a way of contrasting outsiders from insiders, of providing a bigger sense of belonging and of fostering a stronger identity among the participants. As such, Hansen claims, "[...] moralism functioned as an organizational resource in the movement. Each one was asked to

take responsibility for the world's problems and the participants were urged to live more correct and 'real'." (Ibid.: 74).

In its initial years FIVH had an idiosyncratic, at least in a Norwegian context, conception of both its own role and that of the people. Seeing itself as a participant-based movement, it rejected both the traditional organizational form and the traditional role played by members. Instead they fostered an identity centered around participants and the creation of a new moral lifestyle through a focus on education with moralistic elements.

Organizational form

Unlike its contemporaries within Norwegian environmentalism, FIVH rejected constituting itself as an organization, its founders thinking that was too bureaucratic an organizational form. Instead they initially saw themselves as a *folkeaksjon* (people's action), where the 'action' signified the people's swift gathering around its central ideas. In practice this meant that FIVH took on the appearance of a foundation. Its highest organ was the council who met twice a year. The board, following the framework put forth by the council was in charge of overseeing the info-center, where the day-to-day operation was run by the secretariat. This, however, was only the skeleton, the movement FIVH aspired to be was composed of a network of up to a hundred loosely connected local groups as well as a rapidly increasing number of what FIVH referred to as participants (*deltagere*) (Ibid.: 22-35).

After a few years, a dispute arose between those who wanted to keep FIVH as a movement, and those who wished to introduce a traditional bureaucratic organizational form. The latter criticized FIVH's organizational structure for lacking democratic merit. Neither participants nor group representatives had a say in the composition of the council, or any direct influence on the actions of the board or the info-center. The critics' attempt to lead FIVH onto a path of more traditional organizations did succeed in obtaining representation for the

participants both on the council and the board. Nevertheless, more wide reaching reforms were longer in waiting. When FIVH changed its name in 1977 to *Framtiden i våre hender*, it also removed the reference to being a ‘people’s action’ preferring instead the label ‘movement’. This move, however, was not an expression of organizational change. Instead, along with the new statutes of 1978, it represented a continuation of the movement form and as such a vindication of the founders’ ideas of FIVH (Ibid.: 32). It wasn't until 1992 that FIVH, on the initiative from local groups, were led into organizing as a DMO (Løken 1999: 76).¹⁹ Today FIVH has 20 local chapters spread across Norway and employ 35 people working 25 person-years in their headquarter in Oslo. The organization has diversified its tactics, orienting itself more toward politics and the private sector, not only individuals.

4.3 Folkeaksjonen Oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja (FOLVS)

Folkeaksjonen Oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja (The Peoples movement for an oil free Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja) is a Norwegian environmental organization founded in 2009 for the single purpose of “[...] keeping the near-coastal maritime areas around Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (LVS) from being opened up for oil or gas exploration.” (Folkeaksjonen 2009). Because FOLVS is a single issue organization with a short history it is natural to start out by giving an overview of the case which it is concerned, the battle of the Lofoten oil, before I move on to describe the organization itself.

Oil expansion and political deferrals

¹⁹ For more information about FIVH’s current structure see chapter 5.2

Since the start of the North Sea oil boom off the coast of Stavanger in the late 1960s, the area of oil extraction in Norway has expanded northwards at an intermittent pace. This expansion, driven by the oil industry and regulated through government concessions rounds (*konsesjonsrunder*), has to a little extent included local institutions or actors (Kristoffersen 2014: 60). It has not been without opposition, rather it has “[...] contributed to the most polarized conflict line in Norwegian oil politics.” (Ryggevik 2014). After the Norwegian Parliament (*Stortinget*) in 1979 permitted oil exploration north of the 62nd parallel the fault lines have been between those wanting to open the Lofoten archipelago for oil exploration and drilling, and those, like FOLVS, who want to preserve the area due to its biodiversity, natural beauty, and food resources, especially the Lofoten cod (Ibid.).




Figure 1 shows the rough location of the oil sectors Nordland VI, Nordland VII and Troms II in relation to Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (LVS). The black areas PL 219 and PL 220 show where exploration permits were given to Statoil and Hydro in 1996. A more detailed map can be found at (Olje- og Energidepartementet 2011: 101).

The battle over Lofoten began in 1994 when the Labor (AP) government opened the Nordland VI field (see Figure 1) for oil exploration, an area that included the southern outskirts of the Lofoten archipelago. Two years later, in the 15th concession round, exploration permits from the Commerce and Energy department were given to Statoil and Hydro. Statoil drilled the first exploration well in the area in 2000, without result. The second, planned by Hydro, was stopped by the incoming Center-Right coalition government in 2001.²⁰ In addition to stopping oil activity in the Barents Sea they also initiated the first of several temporary halts to the oil activity in Lofoten (Ibid.). When a new environmental assessment plan (*konsekvensutredning*) for Lofoten and the Barents Sea was presented by the same government in 2003, oil exploration in the LVS area was again temporarily halted, whereas the northernmost areas were opened (Olje- og Energidepartementet 2004: 84).

The new Center-Left government, which came to power in 2005, continued the deferred decision making regarding the status of the Lofoten oil fields. First, in the 2006 management plan (*forvaltningsplan*) for Lofoten and the Barents Sea, the issue was postponed until the next term period (Miljøverndepartementet 2006: 123). Then, after another election victory for the Center-Left coalition,²¹ the updated management plan of 2011 stated that the LVS area continued to be off bounds for oil exploration until after the 2013 election (Miljøverndepartementet 2011: 130). The same conclusion was reached in 2013 in the negotiation between the incoming Conservative (H and FrP) government and their backers from the political center, the Liberal Party (V) and the Christian People's Party (KrF), meaning that at present the LVS area is temporarily shielded from both environmental assessment and oil exploration up until the forthcoming 2017

²⁰ This government was composed of the Christian People's Party (*Kristelig Folkeparti* or KrF), the Conservative Party (*Høyre* or H) and the Liberal Party (*Venstre* or V).

²¹ Both the 2005 and the 2009 Center-Left governments were composed of the Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*, or AP), The Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*, or SV) and The Center Party (*Senterpartiet*, or SP).

parliamentary election (Grande et al. 2013: 3). Kristoffersen and Dale describe this process as a ‘strategic advancement’ of oil exploration, where the least controversial fields are opened first, whereas the more sensitive areas are shielded on a non-permanent basis (2014: 212).

Despite being opposed by the two biggest parties, the Labor party and the Conservative party, as well as the influential oil industry, the environmental movement and their political supporters have succeeded, for now, in stopping major oil exploration in the Lofoten area. A central narrative claims that it was the result of a halting tactic made possible by the specific political landscape at the time (Kristoffersen 2014: 62). The political parties were divided into two blocks with one major party each broadly in favor of exploration (Labor and the Conservative party) and several smaller parties against. Since none of the two major parties could win an outright majority, the smaller parties, both the Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Center Party (SP) in 2005 and 2009, and the Liberal Party (V) and the Christian People’s Party (KrF) in 2003 and 2013, have successfully used their position at the balance of power as leverage for stopping the Lofoten oil extraction. This narrative has been used repeatedly by the smaller parties in several election cycles as a selling point proving their influence (Venstre 2013, SV 2015). But the small parties’ victories were only possible “[...] because they could build upon the fact that the opposition among the people was as a whole a lot bigger than their representation in Stortinget.” (Ryggvik 2014). And this opposition was led by a unified environmental movement who claim that their work at a national and local level played an important part in the success. As Informant 1 from FOLVS said: “We have already won this battle twice in the last years.”²²

²² As noted in chapter 3, all the quotes used from the informants have been translated from the Norwegian to English.

The organized opposition to oil

When the idea of expanding oil exploration north of 62 degrees latitude was launched in the early 1970s there were few dissenting voices. Initially, the Norwegian public trusted the state's ability to manage the oil resources in a way that would lead to long-term economic development and with an equitable distribution of the ensuing wealth (Kristoffersen 2014: 22-3). During the next decades, however, a growing skepticism towards the problems of oil extraction had taken hold. Concern for fisheries, operation safety, and the environment increased in the public, among the established environmental organizations, and in several political parties, such as the Socialist Left Party, the Center Party, The Liberal Party and even in some quarters of the Labor Party (Berge 2005: 7-8).

The opposition against oil extraction in the Lofoten area was from an early stage dominated by the established national environmental organizations, as well as fishermen organizations *Fiskarlaget* and *Kystfiskarlaget*. This early cooperation was most visible in the summer of 2000 when *Bellona* and *Natur og Ungdom* together with local fishermen engaged in civil disobedience to block the transportation of the oil rig Transocean Arctic west of Lofoten (Bellona 2001). Research by *WWF* from this period also contributed to an understanding of the LVS-Barents area as a unique ecoregion whose protection required new forms of collaborations and new institutions to sustain (Kristoffersen and Young 2010: 583).

It took twelve years, however, from the opening of Nordland VI until an organized local opposition against oil extraction in Lofoten sprang up. In February 2006 PFL (*Petroleumsfritt område utenfor Lofoten og Vesterålen*) was formed in Vesterålen. The organization was politically unaffiliated and was founded to shift the terms of the debate.²³ Within a couple of months it was followed by *Lofotaksjonen*, a neighboring people's movement formed on the

²³ Because the organization was formed in Vesterålen it is also referred to as *Vesterålaksjonen*.

same principles and objectives.²⁴ These local groups soon established ties with the national environmental movement. In 2007 a platform for a joint opposition to oil exploration was established composed of the two local groups as well as the more established environmental organizations *Natur og Ungdom*, *Bellona*, *Norges Naturvernforbund* og *WWF* (Bellona 2007). The local groups were nevertheless still small, and struggling; *Lofotaksjonen* only had 123 members (Johansen 2007), and *PFL* were in financial troubles (RU 2006). Kristoffersen and Young claim that the general weak level of grassroots engagement at the time was due to Norway's actively inclusive state structures (Kristoffersen and Young 2010: 582).

The engagement level would soon rise, however, when on an initiative from *Natur og Ungdom* (2009), *Lofotaksjonen* and *Vesterålaksjonen* were merged in January 2009 to create *Folkeaksjonen for oljefritt Lofoten og Vesterålen*. At founding they had 800 members between them (Sneve 2009). In October the same year the organization had founded 16 local chapters and gathered 53.000 signatures for their petition to end the Lofoten oil drilling (Pedersen 2009). The island of Senja, and its surrounding maritime areas including the Troms II field, had up until then been beyond the scope of interest of the organization. Since the area has a strong connection to Lofoten and Vesterålen both through geography and fishery traditions, it was decided, at their first *Landsmøte* (National Convention), to incorporate Senja in both their focus and their now current name: *Folkeaksjonen for oljefritt Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja*.

Since 2011 FOLVS has had a stable number of members ranging from 3.500 to 4.500, the current count standing at 4.174. They still have 16 local groups spread across the country, though most of the groups are located in Northern Norway. Like both NNV and FIVH, FOLVS is organized with a National Convention (*Landsmøte*), and a National Board (*Landsstyret*). The National Convention, the

²⁴ *Lofotaksjonen* also went by the name *Lofotaksjonen Vern Nordland VI og VII*.

highest authority of FOLVS meets once a year. All members of the organization are granted voting rights. The Convention makes decisions on matters of policy, economy and strategy. It also elects the National Board who is responsible for the daily operations. The Board is composed of between five and seven regular members and at least five alternates. At least half of the regular members must have residence in the LVS-region (Folkeaksjonen 2009). After their founding FOLVS has figured prominently in traditional media in relations to the 2009, 2011, and 2013 elections (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014: 205). Their center of operations is in Lofoten where most of the board lives and where their real life board meetings are held (most meetings are held on Skype). FOLVS currently employs three people, two of which (the board leader and an information officer) work from Svolvær in Lofoten. In addition an organizational secretary working from Oslo, sharing office space with NNV, is employed in a 40% capacity (Folkeaksjonen 2015b).

Chapter 5: Popular Participation

In their work *Miljøvern uten grenser?* the Bergen Group makes a distinction between the content of environmentalism (*miljøvern*) and its form. Whereas the content is related to the issues and topics the environmental organizations fight for, the form concerns “[...] the citizens’ possibilities as members and activists within the organizations [...] what trends we see when it comes to the members’ role and influence [...]” (Bortne et al. 2002: 12). The form of environmentalism is thus related to how citizens, members, activists, in short ‘the people’, participate in these organizations. In this chapter I will examine the form of environmentalism, i.e. popular participation, as it appears from the perspective of informants working at the central level of NNV, FIVH and FOLVS. I will be looking at how the participation of ‘the people’ is conceptualized in the way the informants understand their own organizations. With regards to NNV this will lead into an examination, presented in chapter 5.1, of the informants’ views on their local group network, democratic structure and mobilization efforts. In 5.2 the discussion will revolve around the question of whether FIVH is seen as movement or an organization by the informants. In 5.3 I will look at two focal points for the FOLVS-informants’ understanding of participation: ‘local adherence’ and ‘popular support’. As we saw in chapter 2.1, a central discussion about Norwegian environmentalism revolved around whether it can be described as a movement. In light of the preceding analysis I will, in 5.4, argue that the informants draw on the image of *folkebevegelse* when they describe their own organizations. Counter to the trend toward a dual-organizational society, from their perspective grassroots involvement forms an integral part of the DMOs. Even if they acknowledge that their organization might fall short on participants, the informants still describe an aspiration for becoming a *folkebevegelse*. In addition, the informants exhibit a clear identification with the environmental movement.

5.1 Local Network and Mobilization in NNV

Based on the recurring topics in my conversations with the NNV-informants I will describe two broad ways they understand popular participation in their own organization: It is understood through the notions of local group involvement and larger mobilization efforts. This is not meant in an exclusive sense, as if they were the only two ways participation is understood; it merely states that these two notions were the most central for the informants. In the following, I will first look at how local group involvement is tied to the democratic character of the organization. When it comes to mobilization efforts, I will focus on the NNV-informants' ambivalent relation the notion of *folkebevegelse*, as well as the organization's association with outside *folkeaksjoner*.

Before we begin, however, it is instructive to briefly consider how NNV's history has played a role in shaping the informants' understanding of it today. The informants see NNV as having played a crucial role in establishing much of the playing field of Norwegian environmentalism:

What NNV has done the last century is to fight for causes, enshrine them into law, and then use those laws to the degree it is possible. When it comes to conservation and biodiversity we have managed, through struggle, to obtain both laws and an accompanying administration. (Informant 8)

In this way NNV's history is connected with certain achievements in the past that continue to shape how the organization works in the present. But when considering the way this fighting was done the same informant reminds us:

It is important to remember that the environmental movement hasn't ... you can't just look at resource aggregation or whatever it is called, abilities to gather resources and power, you have to look at argumentative power and a

few more intangible things, but that has been really important. I think that the environmental movement, it has achieved a lot without actually having the support of the big masses. (Informant 8)

During the first 50 years of its operation, as we saw in the last chapter, NNV was not a particularly democratic or popular organization. The organization continues to rely on lobbying and a close relationship with the state to further their agenda (Bortne et al. 2002: 50-1). Important in this context is that the informants' relation to NNV's 'elitist' past largely limits itself to acknowledging it; it is not how they present the organization as it is today. Any elitist sentiment carried over from their early history is overshadowed by their emphasis on the organization's present democratic structure and local network: "[Our strength] is that we are a locally based democratic organization, so I think that just as important as our achievements on a national level, is what we achieve locally with our local groups." (Informant 10). This does not mean that the informants underplay their close cooperation with the authorities. They recognize that NNV enjoys "[...] intimate contact with the all parts of the administration [*forvaltningen*] [...]" (Informant 8). My focus here, however, is on participation, and a large part of the way the informants view their own organization is in terms of its democratic and local based nature, which I will describe in the following.

Local group participation

Today, NNV has 84 active local groups and 17 regional groups spread out across Norway, which is by far the most extensive local group network among the Norwegian environmental DMOs. For the informants this local group participation distinguishes NNV from both environmental foundations without active members and the other DMOs who all have less extensive local networks: "We do a lot of communication work centrally and [also] lobbyism, so where we distinguish ourselves is that we have a hundred local and regional groups that to

a varying degree, but to a large extent, work with local nature conservation.” (Informant 8). The extensive local group network even leads one informant to come close to claiming that NNV is the only proper environmental DMO in Norway:

[...] we are the ones who represent the grassroots and those interested in the environment in Norway. In that way we are the ones who are the popular conservation or environmental organization. We have about as many members as FIVH, but we have a much larger network out there. (Informant 10)

This statement also claims that NNV distinguishes itself from the other organizations by representing the grassroots. First of all, though not exclusively, this means representing NNV’s extensive network of local groups (*lokallagsnettverk*). According to the informants, local groups usually spring up when an environmental issue, often related to nature conservation, arises close to where the activists live. Activist concerns are thus directed toward local issues like, e.g., the local salamander population, the close by waterway or the nearby woodland area, and normally not toward more overarching issues such as global warming.²⁵ Representing these groups, and providing them with organizational and professional assistance, is seen as providing a key democratic service:

But I think that in some cases we have a local presence in order for people to channel one’s engagement in environmental problems, [...] to join NNV, to be a part, and to raise one’s voice is then a possibility. Both to influence local decisions and to participate in influencing national decisions. (Informant 10)

²⁵ Though certain groups, like the Bergen local group, does work directly on climate related issues.

Participating in the local groups is thus connected with the potential of having a democratic influence over key decisions outside of the organization. The informants identify joining NNV as enabling local activists to have a say.

The informants also make a point of how these groups have a high degree of independence from the main office. As long as they don't work directly counter to NNV's program they are free to work on the environmental cases as they see fit. This independence, however, is seen as a double edged sword. On the one hand it leads to practical problems by making larger coordinated efforts harder:

Sometimes we do have campaigns, we can never demand of the local groups to join a campaign, for they choose themselves what they want to work with, and often it is their own local issues where they live which are the most important [...] (Informant 12).

On the other hand the local groups' independence is perceived as showcasing the democratic aspects internal to the organization. One example, in particular, which illustrates how NNV works as a democratic organization with a high level of grassroots initiative, was mentioned by several informants. It revolves around a central conflict within NNV, namely the status of wind power:

[...] since it is a member organization there are these internal differences [...] those who would like, who are fully against all kinds of wind and water power, who wants to preserve [natural areas], against those who think that 'no, the climate is so important we have to sacrifice [natural areas]'. So when you are a democratic organization you have to find a balance. (Informant 11)

At the same time as wind power is seen by some in the organization as a key alternative energy source necessary to combat global warming others claim wind power development poses risks to wilderness areas. In 2013, in preparation for

NNV's National Convention, a draft of the energy statement summarizing their wind power policy had been worked out with heavy involvement from the National Board (*Sentralstyret*). Their members, in addition to NNV's leadership, include representatives from each regional group, but not the local groups. What happened at the convention was described by one informant in this way:

[...] the National Convention is comprised of a lot of members, the most prominent members of various local groups, and then one experienced that many of those who had approved the document at the National Board level suddenly turned and got their members to vote against it or make additions that changed the wording of the document, and made it a much more hardcore protection [*vern*] document than it was. (Informant 8)

What had been prepared by the National Board and supported by the leadership had been derailed by influential members from the local and regional groups at the last minute. After an attempt to compromise floundered, the changes prioritizing environmental protection were backed by a slim majority. "In practice it was a very clear conflict. [...] Lars Haltbrekken [the NNV Chair] went on the podium and said 'I'm not too pleased about this, but it will work out, this is the way it has to be.' This was really how democracy worked and it did get confrontational." (Informant 8). In one way this development was seen as a mild irritation: "Sometimes conflicts reach the surface that perhaps becomes unfortunate, and that was obviously a problem at the recent National Convention [...]" (Informant 8). But, it also shows how differences of opinion within NNV are allowed to play out. This room for disagreement has several informants likening the organization to a political party:

[...] I also think that it makes it a broader organization because you don't have to agree with everything as long as you agree with some of it. Without drawing

a parallel to a political party, it is a bit like a political party, and you don't have to agree with absolutely everything as long as you agree with the core principles. (Informant 12)

Piecing these elements together we can observe that the informants see the organization's internal democratic character come to life in various ways. First, a democratic element is identified through the existence of internal disagreements and the need to strike a balance between them. It is further observed through the ability of prominent local group activists to upstage the agenda, showcasing grassroots power. Before it is seen through the ability of the leadership to change course and adhere to the majority decision. Participating in the local groups is thus viewed as doubly empowering for the activists. In the external sense of influencing key decisions in the environmental field locally and nationally; and in the internal sense through the grassroots having real power within the organization. The informants see the democratic nature of NNV as stemming from representing and providing an outlet for grassroots initiatives, and this democratic function is accentuated by the local group's resilient independence, and their influence on the organization as a whole. While the Bergen Group describes a trend toward a dual-organizational society, within NNV there still is a self-understanding close in line with the older unified organizational society, where the grassroots have influence at the center level.²⁶

Popular mobilization

The local groups are not, however, the only part of the environmental grassroots supported by NNV. Participation in NNV is also discussed in terms of movement mobilization. My concern here is not to assess whether NNV in fact is or represents a movement. Instead, I will first answer whether it is perceived as such within the organization, before then looking at how mobilization efforts are

²⁶ See chapter 2.2.

framed. Several informants described a desire within the organization for it to be a *folkebevegelse*: “[...] we want to be a *folkebevegelse*, and we want to have as many people as possible supporting us because it gives us clout in the political issues we work with.” (Informant 10). Other informants went as far as claiming that, based on its vast local group network and their number of supporters, NNV, in fact, was a *folkebevegelse*: “Yes, we have so many, almost 20.500 members. We have local groups all over the country and regional groups all over, so yes I will definitively say that [we are a *folkebevegelse*].” (Informant 9). This opinion, though, was not uncontested:

So, no, we don’t put enough effort in, or in my eyes we have allowed the effort to mobilize the great popular masses and recruit members to crumble, and that probably was of strategic reasons because we simply have had other [priorities]. But it hasn’t just been a question of will. It has been a question of ability as well. (Informant 8)

What is meant with ‘other priorities’ is a preference for lobbyism and a more state centric approach to environmentalism. The lacking ability referred to has to do with NNV’s dire financial condition in the 1990s and early 2000s, which is perceived by the informants to have hindered the organization in expanding their outreach. Evaluating NNV based on whether the organization has a large and broad support base, it is clear that opinions differed on whether NNV is a movement. That notwithstanding, there is a clear aspiration for NNV to be a *folkebevegelse*, as being one is viewed positively – also by those who refrained from identifying NNV as such.

For the NNV-informants mobilization is connected to efforts both inside and outside of the organization. Local group participation (in addition to, as described above, being empowering) is described as a mobilization process:

[...] we build up competence and credibility with regards to issues, while at the same time applying popular pressure. And it is about a popular pressure that is built up by NNV from the bottom through local work all across the nation [...] (Informant 10).

In addition to this internal mobilization the informants also tie NNV's mobilization efforts to external 'popular actions' (*folkeaksjoner*), and especially to FOLVS. As we saw in Chapter 4.1 Trædal (2013), in his study of NNV, describes FOLVS as "[...] an important source of climate-related activism within NNV [...]" (Trædal 2013: 53), and claims that NNV is obscuring their own involvement in FOLVS. My informants avoided identifying FOLVS as a part of NNV outright: "No, they are their own organization and they have their own statutes. Like NU, they are also their own organization and they decide themselves what they want to work with." (Informant 12). It was freely admitted, however, both that the two organizations are in agreement on the issues and that NNV played a central part in the foundation of FOLVS: "But, [working with the authorities] doesn't mean that we don't work with people. Because it is about mobilizing. NNV played a part in building FOLVS, and it is to a large extent a popular action [*folkeaksjon*]." (Informant 9). Popular mobilization, then, is not only seen as mobilizing their own local groups, but can also involve channeling people into organizing outside NNV on concrete issues. Trædal notes that such a model had the perceived benefit of not deterring activists who were put off by NNV's other more contentious stances. Underscoring his point he cites NNV's organizational secretary Steinar Alsos:

People can be prejudiced against organizations. They think we are only interested in wolves, and do not see us as a platform to work with oil-related issues. Supporting an organization requires more conviction than supporting one of our core issues. (Trædal 2013: 54)

Funneling popular participation through outside groups is here seen, as Trædal notes, as a way of lowering barriers to entry into activism. In addition I see it as indicating two things. First, it shows a concern over their image being too radical to be broadly appealing. Second, it can be interpreted as a way to avoid compromise, as it enables the organization to hold on to controversial positions while at the same time engaging in broader initiatives. Both issues will be further described in chapter 7.

5.2 FIVH: Movement or Organization?

How do the FIVH-informants understand popular participation within their own organization? In FIVH's case this question is best approached through describing how the informants understand the organization itself. As we have already seen, FIVH started out as a movement of participants before it transitioned into a democratic organization composed of members. From the perspective of the informants, however, this transition is complicated in three ways. First, by the limited participation from the grassroots in the internal democratic process; second, by the lingering movement aspirations of the organization; and third, by the shift in the identity associated with FIVH-participants. These three factors will be examined below, after a short outline of the official organizational changes in FIVH.

When the movement model was replaced by a traditional DMO-model in 1992 the old core structure of FIVH – composed of *Rådet* (the advisory council), *Styret* (the board), the info-center, and the loosely connected groups – was modified into a new, though fairly similar arrangement. From then on *Landsmøtet*, a yearly held national congress, replaced *Rådet* as the governing body of FIVH. Between *Landsmøtet*'s sessions, and on its behalf, the operation was now controlled by *Landsstyret* (National board) instead of *Styret*. The same info-center remained as

the base of operation, and it was still surrounded by thematic and local groups (Løken 1999: 76-7). When compared, the function and distribution of tasks remained roughly the same. The main difference is rather to be found in the local groups' democratic participation in and oversight over the management of the organization. Whereas the old council and board was staffed directly by Dammann and the other founders, *Landsmøtet*, the highest organ of FIVH today, is composed of representatives from local groups and staff as well as independent individuals. By increasing the influence of the local groups and their members the aim was to make FIVH's structure more democratic (Ibid.: 77).

Democratic

The transition from people's movement to democratic organization is not, however, as clear cut as it appears. Firstly, because it is uncertain how democratic the new structure was in practice. Løken, for instance, claims that FIVH's democratization was largely formal, reaching her conclusion on the count that the network of local groups was sparsely built out, and that most FIVH members weren't even connected to a local group (Ibid.). From an inside perspective, Steinar Lem, lamenting the low level of member involvement, claimed that the organization was democratic in name only (1996: 166). Their assessments were from the late nineties, but the opinion about the low level of local organizing is echoed among my informants as well: "To a certain extent the organization has had as a weakness that there hasn't been a very robustly organized grassroots, we have had a fairly high member count, but the organized grassroots work has been limited." (Informant 7). FIVH today has 20 local groups though their activity and permanence vary widely. When asked if the local groups tend to pop up for then only to disappear, one informant answered:

Some are like that, but very many have been there for several years, so they are pretty stable, but it happens that some local groups who just have been started

have been closed again. And it happens that we have to help a bit and recruit a few new [members], and get the momentum up. But it has to be some enthusiasm there to start with, so it doesn't help ... we can't put out the fires if they [the groups] aren't viable. We have about five, six, seven that are pretty stable that have been manned for many years and who are very dedicated.

(Informant 5)

Apart from the variable level of activity and the difficulty in recruiting new members, the informants also pointed out the local groups' independence from the info-center, each group doing their own thing on their own volition. But, given the info-center's many campaigns and interactions with important governmental and business actors, overall the impression given by the informants (all of whom were connected to the info-center) was that the local groups' participation in the organization was, if not dominated by the info-center, then at least overshadowed by it. Unlike the case of NNV, the democratic aspect of participation was not brought up by the FIVH-informants. The development FIVH has undergone seems to be best described as a transition from a roughly defined loosely connected network with a dominant center, to a formally incorporated group structure with a still dominant center.

Folkebevegelse

The second factor complicating the transition from movement to organization concerns the fact that among the informants the terms 'movement' and '*folkebevegelse*' are still being used, even if they are not fully endorsed. Their conflicted attitude is perhaps best summed up by this quote: "[...] it isn't uncomplicated to say that we are not a *folkebevegelse* because we are ... the arguments are there as well, it is a bit more complicated, but formally we are an organization with a history as a *folkebevegelse*." (Informant 7). In what way then could FIVH still be a movement, even if it officially styles itself as a traditional

organization? From the conversations several implicit suggestions arises. One informant speaks of FIVH as a *folkebevegelse* in the context of their mobilization efforts and attempts to sway the political leadership: “It is at least important with regard to the decision makers, that we have something to show off [*å vise til*], that we are a *folkebevegelse* in contact with people from the whole country.” (Informant 4). This reference to a *folkebevegelse* encompasses both FIVH’s members and the organization’s ability to draw in unaffiliated supporters to participate in their campaigns. Another informant comes close to calling FIVH a movement based on its involvement in broader coalitions: “But I feel that the cooperation FIVH has with several other organizations through *Klimavalgalliansen*, if you add up all the members, then it potentially amounts to very many.” (Informant 5). Umbrella organizations and coalition work is an increasingly common way of working in the environmental sector, especially regarding larger projects involving government interaction (Bortne et al. 2002: 107). FIVH participates in several, not only *Klimvalgalliansen* referred to here, but also *Forum for Utvikling og Miljø*, *Nettverk for Mat og Miljø*, and the now defunct *Grønn Hverdag*.

Both these factors could, however, be true of any number of other organizations. FIVH is certainly not alone in participating in coalitions and amassing support from beyond its member base. A third informant draws attention to a factor more unique to FIVH: how it has functioned as an incubator for other organizations. Utviklingsfondet, a solidarity based organization championing food security and biodiversity while fighting hunger and climate change in the global south, was founded by FIVH members in 1978 (Brænd 2009). The research project *Alternativ Framtid* (now *ProSus*) started up in 1986 on FIVH’s initiative. *Forum for systemdebatt* was launched by Erik Dammann in 1998; *Besteforeldrenes Klimaaksjon* formed part of FIVH before it branched off in 2012. And FIVH is also involved in *Regnskogsfondet*, *Publish What You Pay*, *Slett U-Landsgjelda*, *Clean Clothes Campaign*, to only name a few (FIVH 2007). In this way, claims

the informant “[...] it is kind of a FIVH family, with several groups having roots here and people in a network who know each other.” (Informant 7).

Common for all the examples above, even if they don’t in every case explicitly use the term movement, is the sense that FIVH is more than just the core organization. Its mobilizing efforts, its coalition work, and the extensive FIVH-family all point toward FIVH having an existence, a wide network from which to draw participation and support, beyond not only its core structure and staff, but also beyond its members. As one informant referring to former FIVH spokesperson Steinar Lem said it: “[...] he called FIVH an organization bigger than itself. It sounds a bit pompous, but it is a bit about us still having a lot of the features from, call it a *folkebevegelse* [...]” (Informant 7).

As mentioned, however, the informants are conflicted about calling FIVH a movement. A central doubt concerns the number of supporters required. Being a *folkebevegelse* calls for the participation of a certain number of supporters, and in this regard the current number of around 25.000 isn't seen as sufficient: “But a *folkebevegelse* requires that you are many, we are fairly many, but a *folkebevegelse*, then i think maybe around 100.000, maybe more ... So we want to be one, but I think it still is a way to go.” (Informant 5). Notwithstanding that the level of participation in FIVH does not add up to a *folkebevegelse*, there is among the informants a lingering hope of having the impact of one, even if FIVH now operates as an organization.

Identity

The third complicating factor is the question of the attachment or identity connection to FIVH among those involved. Along with the official change from movement to traditional organization there has been a concurrent development away from styling those involved in FIVH as participants. Now, the informants mainly refer to ‘members’, and in different contexts occasionally to ‘activists’,

‘local activists’, or in phrases such as ‘those who support us’ (*de som støtter oss*). For the informants this transition is thematized through a distinction between old and new activism:

I think that for some of the older generation FIVH is kind of this gang of hippies, and that is the identity to many and I think that some of the elders also feel that if they are a FIVH member they are kind of concerned about the environment, you do all the big little things every day to do something for the climate, fellow human beings. Yes, I think there is pride and identity connected to ‘I was in Nadderudhallen in 74’. It is a great identity carrier, but for a lot of the newer, younger members I don’t think it is. And when for example ... we have enlisted very many after the [recent] sweatshop campaign that I don’t think feel the same. (Informant 6)

Whereas older activists were described as ‘manning the barricades’, ‘uniformed almost’, ‘hippies’, as drawing a sense of pride from their involvement, all indicating a strong attachment to FIVH, the younger generation of activist were mainly described in relation to singular activities, especially their activism on social media. In short, the informants identify a transition away from a situation where the ideological components of the organization to a much larger degree shaped the totality of the participants’ lives. As mentioned in chapter 4.2 one of the core aim for the FIVH’s founders was the creation of a new lifestyle. The new form of participation is more limited in scope, more pragmatic, and more short-term. That is not to say that the informants claim that the shift has been absolute, there still are aspects that linger, but the emphasis is on change:

I think that those who are active [now] feel kind of a kinship with something. A strongly pronounced rebellion against consumer society, that is a bit more unwritten, but it is very important this concerning consumer society. We were very ... in old magazines it was very much different, uniformed almost, with

busseruller [old fashioned working shirt], and attitudes and a certain type of identity, and it still lingers a bit, but there have been major changes. We encounter that sometimes, people that have an outdated image of us. (Informant 7)

The last sentiment isn't just an observation, but indicative perhaps of an irritation at being seen as something FIVH now wants to distance itself from:

But I don't think that there are as many from the young generation that have those thoughts about what FIVH is and what identity the organization has, I don't think so. And we try, it is a part of the communication strategy to move a bit away from that. (Informant 6)

We will get back to how this distancing looks in practice in Chapter 7.2. Of import now is that the understanding I have sketched so far centers on two shifts: The first from movement to organization, where some movement characteristics linger, and where hopes of having the impact of a movement remains. The second from participant to member, with an erosion, though not total, of the traditional overarching identity connected to being active in FIVH, an identity it explicitly tries to distance itself from. From the SMT-perspective this seems unusual, given its emphasis on the connection between a movement and a strong identity (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 20). This isn't just a theoretical matter, but something thematized by one informant. After affirming that FIVH is a movement the informant questioned the assumption that a *folkebevegelse* had to be connected to traditional markers of activism identity in the first place:

[...] but at the same time we see that there is perhaps need for a discussion about what a people's movement is. What it means. Before, I think it was more common for people to stand in the streets manning the barricades, but now that

fight has perhaps moved a bit over to Facebook and social media, not totally, but to a certain degree. (Informant 6)

This reasoning is coherent with what I described earlier as a wish to mobilize the masses, and with the distancing from FIVH's traditional identity. The informant's suggestion is that FIVH can function and have the impact of a movement without a strong identity connection, or at least, the same identity connection as before. In this way participation in the organization does not depend on adhering to a set of requirements, but is instead predicated on a more short term or piecemeal engagement. If FIVH is a movement at all now, because of the weaker identity connection, it is so in a very different way than it used to be.

5.3 Local Adherence and Popular Support in FOLVS

Looking at the title of FOLVS, two notions in particular stand out as central, those of local adherence (*lokal tilhørighet*) to the LVS-region, and popular support (*folkelig støtte*). These terms are not empty stand-alone markers, but are located at the root of how the FOLVS-informants present participation in their organization – as demonstrated by statements like this: “It is also important for us to communicate that we are a *folkeaksjon* [people's action] with an origin in Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja.” (Informant 1). Before we begin the presentation of these two notions a clarifying remark is due. In the interviews the importance of the local comes into play in two similar but different manners. On the one hand ‘local’ means adherence to one specific locale, the LVS-area, which is awarded special significance in several respects, as we shall see. On the other hand ‘local’ means local representation in 20 different local groups (*lokallag*) all over Norway. In this second sense, local comes closer in meaning to the term popular support. In this way the two terms, local and popular, blend into one

another, but in spite of this they are still very distinct notions and because of this I will treat them separately in the following.

Local adherence

What does local adherence mean for the FOLVS-informants? The first thing we can note is that the importance of the local is most clearly seen in the very aim of the organization: the protection of the LVS-area. While some of the argumentation used by FOLVS is non-area specific, e.g. holding that exploration must be stopped to mitigate global warming, the main argumentative line is based on the perception that the LVS-area is of special importance:

[...] in any case as I see it, there is something about these areas specifically, it isn't just political arguments, there are some special things about this area that differentiates it from other areas where you also have important nature.
(Informant 2)

This specialness is what spawned the movement in the first place; there is something there that is worth protecting that isn't present other places. On the one hand this specialness refers to the unique natural qualities of LVS: The natural beauty; the World's largest cold water coral reef, Røstrevet; the spawning area for both the last big cod stock as well as “[...] four percent of all the fish caught each year in the world oceans [...]” (Folkeaksjonen 2013). But, on the other hand, it also refers to the local fishing and tourism communities that FOLVS claims will be affected by the oil because they rely on the natural qualities mentioned above. The local communities and the oil industry are framed as pitted against one another in an area conflict. As a FOLVS argumentative document rhetorically asks: “Area conflicts mean there isn't room for everyone. Who do we prefer? The Fishermen who can be there for thousands of years, or the oil industry who can

stay for 40?” (Ibid.). In this way the communities living off these resources in a sustainable way are just as threatened and in need of protection as the resources on which they depend. Therefore, what is seen as special isn't just the natural qualities, but also the communities that are capable of cohabiting with them in a sustainable fashion.

This leads us to our second point: The local communities aren't just perceived as worth protecting, their support and participation is seen by the informants as the *sine qua non* of the organization. You can't achieve the goals of preserving the Lofoten archipelago from oil extraction if you don't have the backing of the locals: “It wouldn't be possible to preserve these areas if the locals had been very positive to opening them [for oil exploration], then one wouldn't manage [...]” (Informant 2). And the reason for that not being possible goes beyond the fact that the organization is run mainly by locals. The same informant continues:

[...] because it is the ones who are closest, who actually feel the practical consequences, in these political debates they automatically get clout [*tyngde*], naturally because it is their situation and life that are directly affected by what is happening. So it is really important for FOLVS to be visible in these regions. (Informant 2)

The support of the locals is seen as vitally important because of the clout they have in political debates. And clout isn't awarded to the locals on the count of previous ills or because of any kind of special local expertise or knowledge. Clout is here understood as being dependent on two factors. The first is self-determination. According to the informants the locals have clout in this matter because, as the above quote states, “it is *their* situation and life [my italics]”, which they have a right to have a say in. In fact, local voices aren't just understood to be important they also claim that they should be more important than other voices: “And we think that the voices from Nordland and Troms and

the voices from LVS should hold more weight.” (Informant 1). This line of argumentation can be seen as a clear reaction to what Kristoffersen and Dale identifies as “[...] a perceived lack of inclusion of local concerns into the decision making process from proponents and opponents to petroleum developments in Lofoten.” (2014: 215). This right to decide is accentuated through the second clout-giving factor, the locals’ affectedness. The locals are understood to get clout because they are the ones who, foremost, will be affected by the oil exploration. Worth pointing out here is that even if the notion of affectedness is used together with the claim that the locals have a right to be heard the informants refrain from framing themselves as victimized:

Things aren’t going downhill, it is not true that Lofoten is a victim in this whole debate. You see that you have lots of possibilities for people moving into the region and for new jobs being created that aren’t consequence of oil and gas. (Informant 2)

This, in part, reflects the fact that the oil exploration has not started, and thus couldn’t have incurred many victims. But it could also be an attempt on part of FOLVS to paint their alternative of an oil free future centered on fishing and tourism as just as strong and viable as one dominated by oil exploration. What is clear is that through the locals’ right to self-determination and their affectedness their participation in and support of FOLVS is seen as essential.

Popular support

Despite the importance put on the local FOLVS is more than just a local organization, and there is no attempt at limiting participation to only people from the region. As mentioned earlier it has 16 local branches spread across Norway. A cynical perspective would point out that popular support garnered in this way

through membership in local branches is important first of all for getting government grants. And indeed the organization estimates that they in 2016 will receive 1.7 million NOK or 71% of their income in government support based on its status as a DMO with a presence across the country (Folkeaksjonen 2015a). So much is true, but pecuniary import is only a part of what popular support and participation entails for FOLVS, and was not emphasized by the informants in the interviews. Instead, garnering popular support, whether through members or non-affiliated supporters, is primarily seen as important because it cuts to the heart of the organization's identity and how it wants to present itself:

For FOLVS it is about showing people in resistance. If you are a board of six people, that will never be popular resistance because you are six people. For FOLVS it simply is important to be many and to be visible in many places, that is how we are a *folkeaksjon*. (Informant 3)

This statement can be read almost as a tautology, having the support of the people is self-evidently a necessary condition for being a *folkeaksjon*. But the statement can also be interpreted as emphasizing FOLVS' identity, stating that to be many is of intrinsic importance for who they are. As the quote above implies there is also a theatrical element – the support has to be showcased. In this way demonstrating one's popular support functions as an argumentative strategy for convincing both the public and the politicians about the merits of the cause:

The strongest argument we have when facing the politicians is that we are many. That there are really many who care about this case, when we can point to that half of the population don't want any oil exploration in Lofoten, then that is an argument that counts a lot for politicians who want to be reelected. (Informant 1)

The more instrumental side of popular support lies, then, in its importance as leverage towards politicians. A way of saying ‘if you don't agree with us we will not support or vote for you’. This numbers game used when swaying politicians is also seen as a selling point when recruiting new members: “People want to be on the winning team, the popular team. In this way being many is communicated both to politicians and to the people.” (Informant 1). In this case the logic of leverage is lost, but both towards politicians and the public an emphasis on being popular is seen as a recipe for increasing support.

Popular support, however, is not just a case of poll numbers or generic supporters, it is also connected with member participation. Their role is also understood differently:

[...] for FOLVS, even if members are important, it is even more important what we do, visibly outside. It is very good for us to have many members in order to say that we are a big movement. But the way we show it is more often through being present in places, having stands in the street, writing op-eds, more than all the time saying that we have 4.500 members, I don't think that is very effective if the members aren't visible in some way. Active members are very important. (Informant 3)

The mere fact of having a high member count is downplayed in favor of how those members participate. Active and visible members are clearly preferred because through their presence in the communities they increase the visibility of the whole organization, which is a way of garnering even more support. In addition, activists are also seen to participate actively in the governing of the organization: “So power is close at hand, and power is distributed evenly. So there is a low threshold to talk to who you want to talk to.” (Informant 2). Both the organizational culture and structure are described as showing great

similarities with NU and NNV, which is not surprising if one takes account of the close relationship between these organizations and FOLVS.

Further, for it to be popular the support must also be broad. For one, this means that their members and supporters have a wide variety of backgrounds. More important than background, however, is an indiscriminate approach to people's reasons for their engagement. Some people's engagement stem from their closeness to the potentially affected area, others from a concern for the climate or for classical environmental protection. Those concerns may be different, but they are all equally accepted in FOLVS. For even if the focus of the organization is narrow, namely stopping oil exploration in LVS, they do not want to paint a picture of themselves as a narrow community, rather the opposite: "This must be a platform where one with different starting points can show that one does not want oil and gas activity." (Informant 2). Even if they view local participation as especially important, they do not operate with any exclusionary mechanisms. Participation, from the perspective of the FOLVS-informants, is open to everyone. Through examining the two identity markers 'local adherence' and 'popular support' we can clearly see that even though the informants imbue local participation with a special importance, FOLVS does not exclude others from participation, they want to appeal as broadly and to as many as possible. As such the informants' image of a *folkeaksjon* shows great similarity to the concept of *folkebevegelse*. The two central differing elements are the limited scope and the brief ad hoc nature of a *folkeaksjon*, as it is only focused on one goal, and has no further purpose once that goal is reached.

5.4 Movement Identification

In the above analysis we have seen that the informants sketch out three different ways of participatory involvement. In NNV participation is connected to empowerment and exercising both internal and external democratic functions.

Within FIVH the democratic aspect, while present, was downplayed. Instead, the informants described a change in participation patterns, from being long-term and involving, to being short-term and pragmatic. For the FOLVS-informants local participation was of particular importance, but not to the point of excluding participation based on other criteria. This diversity of focus is partly a feature of the open interview style, which did not follow a rigid format. The question of participant identity, for example, was a central topic in my conversations with the FIVH-informants, but only marginal in the material from NNV. From this one cannot conclude that member identity is not an important topic within NNV, only that the NNV-informants emphasized other factors. With that caveat in mind, however, I will claim that these differences in emphasis do reflect real differences between the organizations. The NNV-informants' focus on the empowering aspect of participation reflect the prominent role of their local groups. While local participation in FOLVS is grounded in their connection to the LVS-region, the preoccupation with identity in FIVH reflects its history where lifestyle changes have been central.

In chapter 2.2 we saw that the Bergen Group identifies a trend towards a sharper split between the local and the central levels of NEM organizations – what they refer to as the dual-organizational society. As we have seen, within NNV, the grassroots are still held to have a strong influence on the operation of the organization. Regarding FIVH, because they shifted towards a democratic organizational structure comparatively late it is hard to claim that they are moving toward a split. Nonetheless, in FIVH, there is a clearer sense of division between the two levels, as the info-center is considered to overshadow the local group's influence even if the latter enjoy democratic privileges. Being a recent addition to NEM, it is interesting that FOLVS has chosen to follow a traditional democratic organizational model closer to their partners, NNV and NU. Accordingly, the FOLVS-informants emphasized both the importance of the local groups and their proximity to the central decision making process. From the

DMO-informants' perspective, then, there is little to indicate a further movement toward a dual-organizational society. For them the grassroots level still has a salient influence on the operation of the DMOs. This conclusion comes with three caveats, however. First, since almost all the informants came from the central level of their respective DMO, their views do not represent the grassroots, who might have a different perception of the situation. Second, as we saw strongest in the case of FOLVS, talking up activism and support is seen as making it more attractive – a fact that incentives the embellishment of the strength and influence of activists. Third, the conclusion underplays that among the informants there is an understanding of changing engagement patterns. A statement by a FIVH informant is representative in this regard: “[...] there is a transition away from the week-to-week organizing, where one physically attend local meetings. That is on the way down, and it has been for a long time.” (Informant 4). Even if the informants view the grassroots as still having influence on their DMO, on the whole they acknowledge that grassroots engagement is not the same as it was.

Common among all three organizations was a positive view on mass mobilization. The FOLVS-informants explicitly label their own organization a *folkeaksjon*, on the count of their broad and open support base. Even though FIVH officially has transitioned from a movement to an organization, the informants point out lingering movement aspects, like being part of a broader network, and the aspiration of having the effect of a movement through new types of campaigns. The aspiration of being a *folkebevegelse* is also present in NNV, though it is not fully endorsed as an accurate description of the organization. It is noticeable that the DMO-informants for the most orient themselves toward what I in chapter 2.1 described as the Norwegian concept of *folkebevegelse*. This was by far their term of preference. The alternative term *bevegelse* (movement) was used sparingly, while *sosiale bevegelser*, a term less familiar in the Norwegian context, was not mentioned at all. According to their

name, in FOLVS' case the term of use was *folkeaksjon*, which largely carries the same connotations, save for a narrower focus and a clearer emphasis on swift and immediate action. The informants' use of *folkebevegelse* might, on a couple occasions, have been caused by me introducing the term. But, interestingly, when spoken by the informants, it was always imbued with the core meaning of a broad and large support. Thus their use of the term should not necessarily be considered an effect of the interviews.

This does not mean that these organizations are *folkebevegelser*, only that term plays a central part in the way the informants understand their own organizations. As the Bergen Group notes referring to NNV and FIVH: "Those organizations that see themselves as a part of a democratic *folkebevegelse*, are not always what they claim to be [...]" (Strømsnes and Selle 1996b: 282). Nevertheless, it is important to remark, first, that the informants' claims are not baseless. It is not just from the perspective of the informants that the input of the people in terms of activism is seen as important for the success of their campaigns. FOLVS-activists gathered 53.000 signatures against oil-drilling in LVS, putting the issue and the organization on the map (Pedersen 2009). The work NNV's local groups do around the country is vital for the protection of landscapes and vulnerable species and habitats (see e.g. Falch 2013, Heimberg 2014). And short-term activism has been an effective weapon in FIVH-campaigns, e.g. when pressing companies to change their practice. (Fossmark 2013). Even if their support isn't massive, the DMOs do rely on public participation to some extent to further their ends. Second, through stressing their *folkebevegelse*-credentials the DMOs are drawing on a culturally specific image of how activism is done. In this image participation is painted as both large and broad, stressing cooperation more than antagonism. It is measured against this image the informants find their organizations lacking, when noting they have too few members. But it is also this image they follow when they describe what they want for their organizations: To be massive, to be open for everyone, and to have an impact.

As we saw in chapter 2.1 the term *folkebevegelse* is in the literature associated with single organizations. Using the term in a similar way, the informants described their organization *as a folkebevegelse*, rather than *as part of a folkebevegelse*. This does not mean that they don't see their own organizations as participating in a broader movement composed of a network of actors. As we saw in the case of FIVH, it was described both as an incubator for several sister-organizations, and as collaborator with other organizations. Through NNV's active involvement in the founding of FOLVS, the two organizations share an intimate connection. The three DMOs also work together on larger campaigns: "We cooperate with the other organizations on very many climate campaigns, and that is a very conscious move. Because through [cooperation] we are bigger and stronger." (Informant 9). Indirectly described here is a network of cooperating organizations, a phenomenon closer in line with the SMT-definition of a movement. *Miljøbevegelsen* (the environmental movement) is a fitting term to describe this network. Among the informants from all three DMOs this term was used as a point of identification, connecting their organization to the network. Regarding this cooperation one informant said that "[...] the relations within *miljøbevegelsen* has become more congenial, we have gotten better at patting each other's backs and cooperating, there were some hard fronts that are in the process of softening [...]" (Informant 7). In chapter 2.3 we saw that the Bergen Group did not find a common identity that united the 'environmental field'. What we do find, however, if we focus on the DMOs here under study, is, if not a strong common identity, at least a common claims of identification. First, informants from all three DMOs draw on the image of *folkebevegelse* when describing their own organization. Second, the informants in all three organizations identify their DMO as belonging to the same network, as part of *miljøbevegelsen*. On the face of it this seems to agree with Hjelmar (1996) that even if the DMOs operate as pressure groups, when interacting with the government, they still harbor a lingering movement identification.

Chapter 6: Organizational Roles

All organizations fill different roles in different contexts. A DMO might play one role when dealing with the government, and another when cooperating with other organizations, corporate partners, or their members. In this chapter I will expand my analysis of the three environmental DMOs by focusing on the roles they play when interacting with ‘the people’. The analysis will be moving back and forth between describing the explicit and implicit levels of the informants’ understanding. On the explicit level I will seek to describe the role or roles the informants most prominently identify with their organization. This means I will not attempt to write a full taxonomy of all the roles these organizations fill, neither in general nor in relation to ‘the people’; my focus will be limited to the roles most emphasized by the informants. Keeping close to the informants’ statements, I also want to examine if the informants implicitly or explicitly identify one overarching role in relation to all members and supporters or if they understand the roles of their organizations differently with respect to different groups. Since the organizations’ roles, as we shall see, are connected to assisting activism, the way their roles are performed will also inform us about what is perceived as hindering people’s engagement in these organizations.

In the following sub-chapters the discussion will revolve around the roles of the three organizations: Chapter 6.1 will describe NNV as a provider of voice and service, chapter 6.2 will focus on FIVH as educator and mobilizer, and FOLVS’ role as facilitator will be the topic of chapter 6.3. In chapter 6.4 I will argue that the different roles explored are all concerned with making participation and activism easier by removing both practical and ideological barriers to engagement in the DMOs. Based on these roles – and the importance put upon broad popular participation in chapter 5 – the DMOs should be categorized as having inclusive identities.

6.1 NNV: Provider of Voice and Service

How does the NNV-informants understand the roles their organization play in relation to the people? Through the analysis of the interview material I could discern that the NNV-informants implicitly identify an overarching role pertaining to the organizations relation to ‘the people’: that of voice provider. It also became clear, however, that this role is framed in two different manners depending on the target group. I could discern a distinction between NNV’s voice provision and advocacy work on behalf of all ‘environmentally interested’ (*miljøinteresserte*), and its service and voice provision to local group members within the organization. This might seem like an obvious distinction to make, but, as we shall see in the following sections, there is a clearer divide between inside members and outside supporters in the way the NNV-informants present their organization, than in both FIVH and FOLVS.

The role the NNV-informants put most emphasis on with regard to internal members and activists was that of a provider of organizational service. As I will try to show, however, the role of service provider is intimately linked with the provision of voice. We can start by looking at a quote describing different kinds of service provided:

I think that we to a large extent are a service agency [*serviceorgan*], at least the section I work in, which is the organization and communication department, we are of course supposed to support [*gi oppfølging*] and service [*gi service*]. Then there is the specialist department [*fagavdelingen*] who are very competent, but it is a lot about teaching and supporting the local groups, giving tips and advice as to how they can work with their cases where [the activists] live. So I think of the central office as a service agency. (Informant 12)

That the main office was a provider of support and service to the local groups and their members was an oft-repeated refrain throughout the interviews with the NNV-informants. In fact, it was seen as so central to the operation of their main office that the lack of it was described by one informant as resulting in member complaints:

When you are a democratic organization, and you have a central section [*sentralledd*] that work at the office, it can always be someone who thinks that the central office gets too much power, or use too many resources or provides too little service, not enough help when it is needed, so that is a lingering debate. (Informant 8)

Three different activities were talked about by the informants as part of this group or member service. The first was practical support, which is mainly the domain of the organization and communication department. Practical support involves sending material, organizing member lists, communicating organizational information and news, assisting with member recruitment, etc. The second activity framed as a type of service was internal capacity building (*skolering*). Whereas NNV for some time has held courses for activists in general, it is only in the last years they have held leadership courses. These courses focus on: “How to strategize, how to work with the media, how issues should be framed in the media for them to be picked up, but also how to appear as an organization.” (Informant 8). The third form of service provision was connected more directly to the members’ activism:

Being a member of NNV, then you have a whole organization backing you. You can say that we are 21.000 members who thinks that Bymarka in Arendal must be protected, rather than ‘we are five people here who think this would be a bit cool’. It is getting the support of the whole organization, and that you

have an apparatus, you have a secretariat that can help you with things, can help you to write hearings or press releases [...] (Informant 12)

When doing activism the local group members of NNV can count, not only on the practical support of the central office, but also on the power of the whole organization's backing.

As we have seen, the provision of service is explicitly identified by the informants as a prominent role of the organization. When considering the goal of this service, however, it is clear that the role of service provider ties directly in with the provision of voice or representation. Through providing organizational support and service NNV enables local activists to raise their own voices:

But I think that in some cases we have a local presence in order for people to channel one's engagement in environmental problems, [...] to join NNV, to be a part, and to raise one's voice is then a possibility. Both to influence local decisions and to participate in influencing national decisions. (Informant 10)

It is important to note that in the literature on civil society the provision of voice and service are treated as distinct. Whereas the provision of voice has to do with interest representation, the provision of service is connected to welfare (Wijkström and Zimmer 2011: 11-2). Welfare service, however, is not the type of service the informants see NNV as providing. In their way of speaking, provision of service is not identified with welfare benefits to individual members, but with benefits that help activists do their volunteer work. For them, the service they provide is thus intrinsically linked to providing voice.

Despite all the support provided by the organization, the informants acknowledge that it is still difficult to get activists to commit time to volunteer for NNV:

This is a volunteer organization and it is supposed to be on a volunteer basis, and people do have a lot to do in their spare time. You have a job and a family and you are perhaps involved in the kids' after-school activities, and then there are people that think that [volunteering] involves a lot more responsibility and work than it necessarily does. (Informant 12)

Two obstacles to activism are identified here, too little time and too much responsibility. Except for sporadic insinuations that NNV-activism wasn't really that time-consuming or wouldn't necessarily involve much responsibility, however, actual strategies for removing said obstacles were not mentioned. Instead the informants lauded the considerable work and volunteer effort put down by those who were active: "There are very many incredibly talented people in NNV and in our local groups that I am very impressed by. Both with regard to the competence they have and the effort they put in [...]" (Informant 10).

In relation to their members it is clear that the NNV-informants see their role as service and voice providers in the sense I described above. The provision of service, however, is reserved for those affiliated with the organization, and is thus not extended to those outside NNV, unless, of course, they want to become members. With regard to NNV's role in relation to the rest of 'the people', viz. the public, the informants' views were more difficult to ascertain. One possible reason for this difficulty is that NNV's outreach efforts have often been indirect. Mobilization efforts, as we saw in Chapter 5.1, have in several cases been run through people's actions, instead of through NNV directly. More consumer oriented outreach used to be funneled through the now defunct *Grønn Hverdag*, a joint project with several other organizations that was discontinued for financial reasons. That is not to say that their public outreach is non-existent, it just hasn't been prioritized: "We contribute, we are in a dialogue with the communes, we work with the county governor [*fylkesmann*], we work with the government,

more than we have talked to each individual person and said ‘you must do this’.” (Informant 9).

What role, then, do the informants see their organization as taking in relation to the public? One informant suggests that NNV fills an educator role: “Yes, I would say that through a part of our work, we do a lot of information work. Both through, when we are present locally it is about information stands and talking to people and do educational work [...]” (Informant 10). Two such campaigns were mentioned especially, the *Energismart*-campaign and the *Oljefri*-campaign. Even if these campaigns form a part of NNV’s operation the informants, however, are reluctant to ascribe this role as central to the organization. The same informant continued: “But it isn’t our most important job to be a ... still, we must watch ourselves for doing the job of the authorities as well.” (Informant 10). Continuing in the same vein another informant decried: “What campaigns? We don’t have the means to really make something that we really know is going to reach people, so we have to make it in-house, and try to get it out in the media, that is how it is.” (Informant 11). This jibe did not complain that there were no campaigns. It rather suggested that they were underfunded and of a smaller scale. These and similar statements sow doubt over the claim that the educator role, though certainly present, is the most prominent role of NNV in relation to the public.

A more prominent suggestion was connected to the provision of voice. One informant mentioned that NNV, through its environmental work, represented, not just the concerns of activists, but what the majority of the people want: “[...] most frequently we very often have the majority with us, then, in surveys, they very often show that people are very pro nature and the environment.” (Informant 9). Does this mean that the informants agree that NNV represents the general public? One respondent drew attention to the fact that some of the organization’s opinions are far from the mainstream, especially regarding conservation issues: “There are 1% who are negatively inclined to

hydropower and that is our members, haha. That is, kind of, not the masses.” (Informant 8). While NNV does support some popular causes the informants were aware that it does not uniformly do so. A more nuanced assessment that better seemed to capture the informants’ understanding held that NNV represents those who are environmentally interested: “[...] we are the ones who represent the grassroots and those interested in the environment [*miljøinteresserte*] in Norway.” (Informant 10). In this way, when NNV is doing advocacy work in the media, and when they work with the various levels of the government, they are framed as speaking for and representing those who care about the environment.

We can observe then, that even if there are considerable differences between the two roles discussed, both have to do with the provision of voice. With regard to the members the informants view their organization’s roles as providing service for the purpose of letting their members have a say, in this way enabling their members. With regard to the public, the same notion of service does not apply, but the notion of voice does, only here it takes on a different form. Providing voice for the environmentally interested means speaking for them, while providing voice for the members means helping them speak for themselves.

6.2 FIVH: Educator and Mobilizer

So far in our analysis of FIVH we have seen how its transition from a movement to an organization has been understood by the informants. The roles which FIVH has taken toward the people, in contrast, have been more stable. The two interconnected roles of educator and mobilizer have been central to FIVH since its inception, and accordingly the informants explicitly identify them as such. These roles are overarching, i.e., it is the roles the FIVH-informants see their organization take both toward members and outside supporters. That is not to say that FIVH doesn’t have other roles in relation to ‘the people’. The provision of

service was briefly mentioned by the FIVH-informants, but was overshadowed by the two other roles and will not be discussed in the following.

We have already seen how the info-center played an important part in the founders' strategy of enlightening people about the unjust resource distribution of the world and how individuals could act to improve it. Employing a broad focus FIVH's education activity today ranges from broadly appealing consumer tips to more narrowly oriented reports and investigatory expositions. Thus, both the info-center and the closely aligned educator role have continued to characterize FIVH's work and are key to how the informants understand FIVH today. Just as central as the role of educator is the role of mobilizer: "I think the most important function we have is mobilization, and perhaps initiate and spearhead some processes, it is in a way about moving [*bevege*] and mobilizing [*mobilisere*]. Mobilizing people to join, get involved and you start something." (Informant 7). We have already looked at the informants' lingering aspiration for FIVH to be a movement, in the sense of having the capacity to mobilize. Important to note here, however, is that the two roles of educator and mobilizer are not seen as contradictory or unrelated, they are understood as deeply intertwined:

For FIVH's part the history here in any case is that the main office was an info-center. It has been a point the whole time both to run a popular education program (*folkeopplysning*), and that when you have enlightened people about a topic, give people an alternative course of action (*handlingsalternativ*), giving people the opportunity for concrete action on the basis of an established problem. (Informant 4)

In this way the educator role is not about spreading neutral information. Instead, through its focus on establishing problems with accompanying courses of action it is deeply connected to motivating and mobilizing people to effectuate change. Among the FIVH informants the educator-mobilizer role is perceived as the role

people want them to play, giving them information and solutions which they see as useful: “I think primarily that it is a model that actually is in line with something people want.” (Informant 4).

A central factor when providing such action oriented information is the informants’ clear picture of who their members and supporters are. They know, e.g., that about 2/3 of their members are female, they mostly live in urban areas, they are highly educated and have a median income. This information stems not only from interaction with members and the public, it is backed by member surveys, opinion polls and interaction data from social media statistics. And it is knowledge actively used when targeting potential members or activists:

We have reason to believe that these groups have a special interest in the topics that the organization work with. We think that is an acknowledgment we have, and I also think that the way forward, where we have the greatest chance of succeeding, at least when it comes to fetching new members, then it will be in these segments here. (Informant 4)

Their knowledge doesn't stop at who to target but they also have clear picture of how best to reach them through the media:

We know a bit about who watches NRK, who reads Aftenposten and regional newspapers which we reckon are central for us. It is based on user surveys and the like. Especially NRK is a big institution and they have different platforms, but they have many platforms that hit our target group pretty good. So I would say that we have fairly many discussions on choice of press, media for our messages. (Informant 4)

Access to the media is something they work to obtain, but is not perceived as difficult: “[...] as late as yesterday there was a debate on Dagsnytt 18, where

Arild [Hermstad, leader of FIVH] was present. Which he is often, he has almost got a punch card [*klippekort*] in these settings, so we are on the inside of that arena.” (Informant 7). This detailed knowledge both of their potential supporters and how to reach them leaves the impression of an organization which takes education and mobilization of their supporters very seriously.

The fact that targeted communication is of importance to FIVH is a heritage from founder Erik Dammann whose background was from the advertising industry. The advertising roots are still noticeable through their current cooperation with advertising firms like Uniform. Through one such collaboration a categorization of FIVH’s supporters was drawn up for internal use. They divided their member base into four different segments. There was Sølve og Sølvi Selvberger (Self-sufficient), representing a small group of eco-minded idealists and self-sufficiency advocates, who grew their own food. Wenche Verdi (Value) was an elderly widow, connected to missionary circles, and represented those with a burning desire for solidarity. Arne og Anne Almén (Common), representing the largest group, were urban, public sector workers, who supported FIVH’s ideals, but didn’t live up to them in practice because of a busy work and kids schedule (*tidsklemma*). The last group was represented by a student who ate organic food and was well versed in the theoretical groundwork of environmentalism. The impact of this categorization should, however, not be overstated: “It has been used a bit, it was referred to, a kind of reference point sometimes [...] but it is of course very rough and generalizing [...] And I don’t think people are as different as we want to believe.” (Informant 7). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this categorization is reflected in how FIVH presents itself. They have, for instance, tried to avoid using images of too alternative self-sufficient types on the cover of their magazine because it would be seen as an endorsement, in a way it wouldn’t in other more mainstream publications:

Yes, we wanted to frame ourselves in a different way, because it was, it would be too one-sided, and it would be perceived as if we said ‘this is how everyone should live, this is a great idea, move to the countryside and get a millstone and live that way’. And we didn't mean that [...] (Informant 7)

FIVH, then, is an organization that not only has a clear picture of its supporters and how to reach them. It also uses that information in their education and mobilization efforts to frame themselves in specific ways. On the one hand they target specific groups seen to be especially receptive to their message. On the other they try to avoid appearing too extreme in order to attract a broader segment of the public. This dynamic will be explored further in Chapter 7.2 with regard to FIVH's connection to moralism.

Since the aim of FIVH's information work is to motivate action the informants often put emphasis on communication features that could help or hinder activism and mobilization. Positive, inspiring messages in a feel-good wrapping is seen as important: “[...] we want to inspire, and we often feel we succeed doing that [...]” (Informant 5). A key communication feature of the educator-mobilizer role in FIVH, is the distinction frequently made by the informants between abstract and concrete information. Whereas abstract, complicated, technical information removed from everyday life is seen as a hindrance, information that is presented in a concrete, simple manner, and connected to the people's everyday lives is preferred:

[...] we have to meet people where they are, and with the cases they are concerned about, in a way that impacts them, and then it is just a fact that you can't talk about system critique at an abstract level, it isn't easy to get people involved. You can explain to people that the jeans you have are actually a very bad solution, there are other ways to make it, or if we give the workers at least ten kroner more an hour, then they would have a salary, that is a decent life. So,

simpler things are easier to get people involved, and then perhaps, to the degree it is a point, get people involved in the encompassing politics. (Informant 7)

Another important distinction the informants make is that between high and low bar activities (*høy- og lavterskeltilbud*). Low bar activities could involve, e.g., signing a petition, receiving newsletters or becoming a passive member. The idea being that “[...] to start off with some low bar activities would be a gateway to participating in something bigger the next time.” (Informant 5). This would include joining a local group or participating in a campaign or protest. The people are to be met with concrete easy to grasp information about a problem and practical simple solutions to that problem, with the hope that they will become more involved.

Inherent in such a strategy is the notion, as we saw Informant 7 put it above, that “[...] it isn't easy to get the people involved [...]”. If we interpret the abstract/concrete distinction as more than a just strategical tool, it can also be seen as a diagnosis of why it is difficult to motivate people: the problem is too abstract or removed from them to be grasped. In a similar vein the low-bar activities suggest that the people aren't willing to do demanding work on behalf of the organization. That isn't to say that the informants see the people as cognitively unable to understand complex issues and morally unwilling to act on them. Instead they see it as a function of available time and a busy schedule: “[...] people are very busy today and they have many irons in the fire, so not everyone feel that they have the time to involve themselves in volunteer work in that way. Or to prioritize it.” (Informant 5). At this juncture the personality categorization we described above comes into play as well. The picture we have drawn up of FIVH's education and mobilization role appears to be directed at the most common FIVH supporter, the Alméns. This is a family that aren't able to follow all of FIVH's ideology because they don't have the time. They need someone who

makes it easier for them, by providing information and action alternatives; and that is the role FIVH attempts to fill.

6.3 FOLVS: Facilitator

What role do the FOLVS-informants see their organization take in relation to the people? As is the case with any organization FOLVS' realm of operation is constrained both by resources and by competing organizations. I will begin this section by considering a statement by an informant that is as much about what roles FOLVS doesn't occupy as the ones it does:

The strategic assessment from our side is that we don't have the resources to be present at every meeting about this case and in all hearings [*høringar*], to learn every new fact. We have partners for that who do well. Our role is more to relay this to the people, and try to involve more, and gather the great grassroots passion. (Informant 3)

At the same time as lacking resources limits FOLVS' ability to take on the roles of fact-finders or bureaucratic negotiators, the presence of other capable organizations in their field is also perceived to limit the need for FOLVS to engage in such roles. Instead the informant here alludes to two central roles of the organization: the role of an intermediary between the experts/authorities and the people; and that of an involver who gathers grassroots engagement. Those were not the only roles that came up in my conversations with the informants. Also mentioned was the role of a unifier ("FOLVS unites people who have very different reasons for being against oil drilling there [LVS]." (Informant 3)), and that of a facilitator (*tilrettelegger*). Among these, I want to put emphasis on the facilitator role. Through the turn of phrase 'to facilitate' (*å legge til rette for*) it stood out as the role most frequently alluded to. It is also the one I deem the most

central, and that through which all the other roles should be understood in light of, as I will attempt to show.

What does being a facilitator mean in practical terms? First, it means setting the entry bar low. The informants claim that FOLVS puts an effort into making it as easy as possible for people to give their support: “[...] each time someone wants to get involved we have to pick it up and facilitate so that everyone who wants to get engaged in FOLVS are enabled.” (Informant 2). This means both making it easier to become a regular member as well as supporting grassroots initiatives. Such an approach might sound a bit indiscriminate and indeed the types of projects that have come out of this bottom-up strategy show great range:

The thing about FOLVS is that there is room for every possible way of organizing. Some do yoga against oil drilling, and just do yoga, but makes the cause visible. While others are more directed towards the politicians, going to local council meetings and persuading the council to say no to oil exploration. But FOLVS has not chosen between those strategies, we shall house all possible ways of getting involved against oil exploration. (Informant 3)

This entails that supporting FOLVS might be termed minimally committal: “I think a lot of the motivation comes from people seeing that it works, that it is possible, that FOLVS, there aren’t many things that you have to agree with [...]” (Informant 2). When you sign up, you sign up for one thing, you do not commit to a long list of causes. In keeping with the narrow focus of the organization and the perceived importance of a broad public appeal FOLVS’ chosen path stays away from heavy ideological baggage and grand visions. That doesn’t mean that they don’t have any visions concerning the future they want, sustainability is frequently mentioned for instance, but the specifics are mostly left out: “It is complicated, because we agree on one unifying thing, that we don’t want oil and gas activity. And then we have phrases concerning everything else

one can do, that are very general phrases.” (Informant 2). Concretely this position means, as we have seen, that they don’t advocate against oil exploration in other areas than LVS. Neither do they take a stand against the main driver of oil drilling, i.e., oil consumption: “But that is also a natural cause of us only caring about oil exploration in Lofoten, and there are many links (*ledd*) from that to people’s consumption.” (Informant 1).

When asked whether it is unfortunate that the organization can’t give a more specific new vision for the region one informant answered: “No I don’t think so. I think it is really positive because the whole point is to get a debate.” (Informant 2). Instead of imposing specific visions for the region, other than that it should be oil-free, they want to spur enthusiasm and debate around the future of LVS where the locals themselves can be heard: “There are lots of people that care about this case, and we are facilitating for that to be shown.” (Informant 1).

If we look back at the other roles mentioned above, through the lens of the facilitator role we see that we can describe them with more specificity: Being a facilitator not only means to relay information, but doing so in a matter that makes it easier for people to be engaged, and without trying to impose one’s views; it means not only to gather and involve people, but to make it as easy as possible to join; not only to unify people around a single cause, but to avoid trying to make them commit to more ideological standpoints. Does this minimal approach mean that they think people are lazy or not as engaged in their cause? The short answer is no. As the above quote shows, one assessment is that the people are already engaged, the problem is rather to make that engagement visible. But a lull in activity at the time of the interviews caused by their temporary victory makes the question of engagement more pressing: “People still care just as much about the case, but they might not participate as much at the moment because it doesn’t feel like the most important case, there are a lot of other cases more acute at the moment.” (Informant 1). If not a judgement on

people as lazy, it is at least an acknowledgment of the difficulty of motivating people. Another obstructing factor is the competition from other causes: “[...] of course we know that it doesn't weigh the most when people choose which party they vote for. But it can at least have an impact.” (Informant 1). The facilitator role can be seen as an answer to both these challenges by making it as easy as possible for people to be involved.

Being a facilitator thus means taking a very pragmatic approach to activism. An approach where the number and especially the visibility of supporters count, hence a broad, inclusive approach with low barriers to entry. Even if local support, as we saw in chapter 5.3, are deemed important, FOLVS' outreach is open for everyone. To further ensure engagement they have chosen to keep a narrow focus, honing in on one central aim, at the same time as avoiding potentially alienable positions such as anti-consumerism or anti-oil exploration. Going beyond the narrow focus would also be going beyond the role of facilitator.

6.4 Inclusive Identity

In the above analysis I found in each organization a different, though similar, overarching role. This does not mean that the DMOs treat all people the same way, or that the DMOs have the same strategy to reach all groups of people. They do, of course, behave differently when it comes to passive and active members, avid supporters and more reluctant ones. To state that there is an overarching role means rather that there is an overarching coherence in the way the DMOs behave with respect to these various segments. In FOLVS activism was facilitated for members and supporters alike. Similarly, in FIVH, members and supporters were to be educated and mobilized. This could happen in various manners and through various channels, but the overarching role guiding this interaction would be the same. This is best illustrated with the case of NNV. While their role in relation to

members was as a service provider, in the public context the role concerned the representation of those environmentally interested. Both roles, as we have seen, are connected to the provision of voice.

As for the different roles of the three DMOs they all share the similarity of assisting activism. Does this similarity mean that the roles here described are but different names put on the same phenomenon? No, the roles are not interchangeable; instead their differences highlight real differences between the organizations. It is not coincidental that NNV, the organization with the most extensive local network, is also the organization where service provision to local group members is identified as a key role. Their orientation toward the government, both at the local and national level, is also a natural fit with the provision of voice. The educator-mobilizer role in FIVH, in contrast, reflects the organization's stronger orientation towards individuals. FOLVS' facilitator role is predicated on the narrow focus of a single issue organization and would not fit organizations with a more diverse portfolio of activities.

When that is said, the similarity of the roles adopted by the DMOs is revealing in several respects. First of all, their concern for assisting activism confirms what we saw in chapter 5: the DMOs value popular engagement within their organizations. In addition, the similarity of the roles points both to common challenges facing the DMOs and to common solutions. The informants feel that the people are hard to engage, they are perceived as busy and preoccupied with other activities. I will refrain from positing a cause and effect relation here, but it is natural to connect the roles which focus on activating people, on the one hand, with the perception of a disengaged public, on the other. For all three DMOs, activism is to be made easier by removing potential barriers to engagement – a strategy which includes both making participation practically uncomplicated as well as easier to accept ideologically. NNV's provision of service to local group members; FIVH's focus on low-bar activities; FOLVS' openness to supporting

grassroots initiatives: all are examples of practical facilitation for the purpose of making activism easier. Among the informants there also seems to be a recognition that it is not conducive to participation to be identified as too radical. In chapter 5.1 we saw how NNV, instead of organizing the popular opposition to the Lofoten oil exploration in-house, channeled participation into FOLVS. By avoiding the associations to NNV's more contentious policies, thus making opposition to oil look less radical, the barriers to participation were lowered. Accordingly, FOLVS, as a single issue organization, has avoided taking controversial stances outside their position against the Lofoten oil exploration. In the case of FIVH the organization is trying to distance itself from being associated with images of self-sufficient types, for fear of alienating their more moderate target groups.

In this way the DMOs' roles indicate an orientation toward environmental organizing which emphasizes pragmatism before ideology and attempts at transforming people's lifestyles. The organizations see it as more important to mobilize around specific issues than to foster broader environmental sensibilities. In chapter 5 we saw, in all three DMOs, that participation was conceived of as broad and open to all. Based on the above discussion we can now observe that the three DMOs all show signs of an inclusive identity, as described in chapter 2.3. This is first indicated by the fact that the 'we' of the DMOs is a broad 'we', encompassing all those inclined to join. Second, after describing the DMOs' roles it is clear that the informants do not see it as a prime objective of their organizations to foster a collective identity around the markers of a specific group, ideology or lifestyle. This is in agreement with the Bergen Group's observation of a shift in the organizations' focus away from controlling their members 'faith': "Now, attitudes, to a larger degree are developed other places – before people approach the organizations." (Strømsnes and Selle 1996a: 29). To clarify, that there is no attempt to foster a collective identity around a specific (exclusive) group, ideology or lifestyle, does not mean that there is no collective

identity. It means rather that the collective identity of these organizations is inclusive, i.e., based on a broad inclusive ‘we’.

Having an inclusive identity has been linked to weaker solidarity between members (Saunders 2008: 237). In contrast, according to Della Porta and Diani, having a stronger connection, like in the case of organizations with exclusive identities, brings the advantage of reducing risks and costs of participation: “[...] feeling part of a shared endeavor and identifying one’s own interests not only at the individual level but also at the collective level makes costs and risks more acceptable than they would otherwise have been.” (2006: 102). The DMOs’ inclusive identity and their roles related to assisting activism could be seen as a different way of reducing costs and risks for the participants. Signing a petition is less costly/risky than a full out participation and identification. Instead of being motivated by a common purpose, participation is enabled by making efforts as easy as possible. But it makes little sense to participate only because it is easy, there has to be other motivating factors. Given that the benefits of environmental activism in many cases are not linked directly to the individual in the same manner as in other social movements (e.g. the LGBT-movement, where the activists themselves stand to benefit directly from activism) it is reasonable to assume that there is an element of a ‘shared endeavor’ also in this form of participation. One can easily imagine that those who sign petitions and partake in online activism feel part of a shared endeavor, just as someone engaged in a lifestyle change. As one FIVH-informant put it: “I think that they who are active [now] feel kind of a kinship with something.” (Informant 7). The difference, however, is the strength and intensity of the link.

To summarize, the roles of the Norwegian DMOs reveal them as inclusive organizations, which instead of creating exclusive identities for their operations rely on weak identity connections drawn from outside the organizations.

Chapter 7: Public Stereotypes

A common trope throughout the interview sessions was the informants' concern that the public had negative pre-conceived notions of their own organization. Specifically, this was expressed as a worry about being pigeonholed as elitist, negativist or moralist. Expressing such concerns the informants engaged in a characterization not of themselves or their own organization, but of the public's potential understanding of these organizations. As such they were identifying a problematic aspect of their relationship with the people. Even though these three concepts can be brought under the rubric of stereotypes, it is interesting to note that each organization has its peculiar version. For the FOLVS-informants it was the issue of elitism, in FIVH it was the charge of moralism, and for NNV it was both moralism and negativism.

Following the same structure as the last three chapters, I will in the upcoming sub-chapters mainly focus on two things. First, I will look at how these stereotypes are described within each organization. Second, I want to investigate how these stereotypes are dealt with, specifically to see whether the informants connect concrete actions or strategy changes to remove themselves from these stereotypes. In conclusion, I will argue that when reacting to the stereotypes associated with their organization the DMOs engage in a frame negotiation process, where the DMOs adjust their identity and their agenda to fit a more moderate image.

7.1 Negativism in NNV

In my conversations with the NNV-informants two stereotypical views of the organization were mentioned, moralism and negativism. Of these two the charge of negativism struck a deeper chord and was seen as a bigger problem. When the

label ‘moralist’ was discussed it was accepted, to a degree, as a part of who they were: “Afraid, no, we are moralists [*moralister*], of course we should be perceived as moralist. That is, our job is to talk about what’s important to do for Norway and the world.” (Informant 9). It should be pointed out that the acceptance of the moralist label only meant an acceptance of a specific type of moralism:

Well, approaching individuals and telling them that they should feel guilty for driving a car to the store, we don’t do that. We don’t want to be that type of moralist. To tell [former prime minister] Stoltenberg that ‘you have a moral responsibility for future generations’, that is the type of moralist we are. (Informant 9)

The NNV-informants, then, do not see themselves as traditional moralists haranguing individuals. Instead, moralism is connected to making powerful actors aware of their responsibility. As such it is accepted as a fundamental part of the organization, and as an impetus for their activism: “We are in the business of [*driver med*] morals, so that isn’t a problem. That is as it should be [...] You have to have a foundation.” (Informant 8).

Moralism was neither seen as a problematic nor the most common stereotype the informants thought the public associated with NNV. That position was given to what might be called negativism: “And [people] might have an impression of NNV as an organization that takes care of the earth, but perhaps also is a bit against everything, to put it bluntly.” (Informant 10). Negativism can be categorized as a near relative of moralism. Instead of saying to people what they should do, you say that they can’t do what they want or are about to do. For the NNV-informants, negativism is seen as an unfortunate effect of their activism:

Because, as an environmental organization one can easily be seen as the ‘no to everything’ guys, you always say no [...] and it can be a bit demotivating that you always are the negative one, who always goes against development [...]
(Informant 12)

Saying no to development projects such as mining depots or dams was by the informants seen as creating an image of the organization as negative, whiny (*sutrete*), and reactionary (*bakstreversk*). When speaking about NNV’s project *Naturglede* (Nature joy), which tries to connect the beauty of nature with the threat of climate change, one informant said:

People go around the forest in Nordmarka, [and say] ‘it was nice here’. What we do then is to say ‘no, it actually isn’t, because this is not a natural forest, it isn’t nice at all, it is really ugly. We have a very specific [view of nature], we are like a poisoned chalice [*malurt i begeret*], nobody wants to admit to this. We are involved in nature wrath [*naturvrede*], we make people pissed off [...].
(Informant 8)

Even if said half in jest, this description nevertheless illustrates how NNV’s environmental stances can be perceived as standing in the way not only of development, but also of ordinary people’s enjoyment of nature.

NNV’s negative image was among the informants seen as something that should be countered, and there was already a new strategy in place. Part of the diagnostic was that the problem was largely driven by the media: “[...] it is much easier to get media exposure by saying no to things.” (Informant 12). Accordingly, the solution was a new media approach. As part of the service provided to their members NNV has started to include media training with advice on “[...] how it is smart to present our cases to the media for them to be picked up by the media, but also about our appearance as an organization.” (Informant

12). This information was part of a new overarching communication strategy also used at the central level:

In the new communication strategy we try to think in a bit new and a bit different way as well. Because it easily comes to us just saying no to everything, at least it appears that way in the media. And now we have attempted to think that if we say no to something, we should also try to emphasize what we really say yes to. (Informant 11)

To combat the negativist stereotype, a focus on solutions, not just on problems, was to be implemented. Several examples were given as to how this would look in practice. In addition to saying no to building a new highway, they would promote bike lanes and footpaths. In addition to saying no to oil, they would say yes to renewable energy sources. In addition to just saying no to a development of an IKEA store in an area worth preserving, they would promote the building of one where it didn't do the same damage. The phrasing 'in addition to' is important since for the informants this change is understood as a supplement to, not as a relinquishment of, their positions: "When I talk about that we shouldn't just say no, but say yes, then that isn't, we shall of course protest, that is not it. It is more about trying to get a more positive spin, to get more impact." (Informant 11). The new strategy is in this way not understood as compromising their policies. Further, the change is seen more as one of emphasis, than one of actual policy change:

I think that we always have been focused on both [the positive and the negative], but that we perhaps focused more on the negative before, more on the consequences than the solutions. But, now we focus more on the solutions and that we communicate those outwards. (Informant 8)

NNV, of course, had policies on renewables and bike paths before the change in communication strategy made them emphasize it to a larger extent. In this way combatting negativism is perceived more as a change in communication and framing than as an actual change in policy.

Recollecting our findings from chapter 5.1, a pattern starts to emerge. Just as NNV's funneling of engagement into FOLVS could be seen as a way to hold on to controversial positions while at the same time engaging in broader initiatives, so is combatting negative stereotypes a way to keep their policies and attract a broader public. Both cases are examples of retaining a more unpopular, radical profile while opening up for a broader public support based on a more moderate image. That is, both cases are ways to avoid compromising.

7.2 Moralism in FOLVS

As we saw in Chapter 5.2 the charge of moralism has been directed against FIVH since its early years. But, whereas moralism could be seen as the glue that bound the early movement together around a shared identity, the informants now identify moralism as a problematic stereotype that is tied to the central educator role, which I explored in chapter 6.2. While, as we saw, some informants claim that this role represents the role the people want FIVH to fill, the strategy of focusing on individual consumption does have some risks:

To challenge individuals has the advantage that it can make something which is very abstract very concrete, and bring it into people's day-to-day life. And it also has the drawback that it can be perceived as moralizing, and that you push people away by bringing these questions up, the way you bring it up pushes people away [...] (Informant 4).

First of all it is important to note that not all the informants saw moralism as negative, remarking that it was of importance to have a focus on morality and to stand behind their moral arguments. Nevertheless, they were not keen on being perceived as moralists either. “But yes, I see it as a form of danger, but it is also something which we have tried to avoid.” (Informant 6). In my conversations with them the informants used several arguments to distance FIVH from the moralism charge. One argument was that since there are more radical environmental actors with more dystopian visions, then FIVH was at least not the worst offender. Another argument held that since FIVH provided people with concrete solutions to the problems they pointed out, at least they should be distinguished from the guilt only variant of moralism. This amounted to in effect claiming that theirs was a more constructive form of moralism. In addition, two informants referenced a recent in-house survey that showed that moralism isn't a term people outside of FIVH frequently associate with them. Through these examples a pattern of distancing FIVH from moralism emerges.

The avoidance of the label of moralism has had a noticeable effect on their campaigns and outreach, where they have taken concrete steps in order to attempt to seem less moralistic. In chapter 6.2 we saw how FIVH's member magazine avoided using images of too alternative self-sufficient types on their cover because it would look like an endorsement, and thus set standards too high for many to follow. Another example was their recent campaign to reduce meat consumption:

In the food campaign we had last fall there was a very clear or pronounced strategy that we shouldn't at all say: ‘People, you have to stop eating meat’ or: ‘You have to become vegetarians’. We should say: ‘We have to eat a bit less meat’. And we really tried to push ‘Yes, eat a bit less meat, then you can eat more fruits and vegetables’. By, for example, pushing fruit and vegetables up

instead of just pushing meat down, yes, that was a part of the strategy.
(Informant 6)

In both these cases, the FIVH-informants in effect describe attempts at distancing themselves from the moralism label. This is done by reducing the requirements and lowering the bar for people to follow a sustainable lifestyle. In a similar fashion to NNV, there is a balancing act going on between keeping their ideals and broadening their appeal. That is to say, the FIVH informants don't mind moralizing as long as they aren't perceived as being moralizing:

We think that [...] the consequences become greater by having a bit simpler or nicer communication, but our target, and the way we work politically, for example, shall still be as ... the level of ambition shall still be as high.
(Informant 6)

Their goals are the same, they are just to be achieved through a communication strategy that puts emphasis on not demanding too much of people. As we have seen for FIVH this is a familiar problematic. Hansen, describing the organization in the 70s frames the problem as a wedge between “[...] the need for one common core that unites the participants versus an ideological openness to gather as many as possible.” (Hansen 2007: 71). There are two dimensions to this conflict, the radical-moderate dimension, and the exclusive-inclusive dimension. In its early years FIVH attempted to build a more exclusive identity based on the fostering of specific lifestyle choices. Now participation is less demanding, it is more inclusive and open to anyone at their preferred level of engagement. We can also see that through framing themselves as less moralistic, they are attempting to move away from being perceived as too radical by creating a more moderate image of themselves. Such a move is in agreement with FIVH's educator-mobilizer role, where they want to appeal to the broad segment of

normal people. It is important to note, however, that from the informants' point of view this change has more to do with how they frame themselves than a change in policy.

7.3 Elitism in FOLVS

In chapter 5.3 we saw how important local support was for the FOLVS-informants. Conversely, we find an equally strong enmity towards being perceived as lecturing elites coming from outside of the region: “And that is important to say, so that people don't think that it is the ‘caffé latte youths’ in Oslo who run this organization, because they in no way do.” (Informant 1). Norwegian environmentalism is also mainly an urban phenomenon (Bortne et al. 2002: 23), and the term ‘caffé latte youths’ used here implies ignorance of the local conditions, through indicating urbanity, fashion and trends, notions that are antithetical to an authentic long-term engagement.

Despite the organization's firm roots in the region, the connection between FOLVS and urban environmentalists isn't far-fetched considering, as we saw in chapter 5, both their substantial cooperation with the other environmental organizations, and their close connection to Natur og Ungdom especially: “It might be a point that half the board comes from Natur og Ungdom and probably is pretty affected by the organizational culture there [...]” (Informant 3). The close ties between FOLVS and the rest of the environmental movement has also been pointed out by local proponents of the oil industry, in order to de-legitimize their campaign (Kristoffersen and Dale 2014: 224). Being identified in this way could put FOLVS in the same category as they perceive the oil industry to fill, the preachy outsider:

That we to a larger degree are people's neighbors, who you meet on stands each Saturday, whereas the oil industry is more of a business. A lot of people are skeptical towards those from the outside. And that is why it is important to have local groups, that you are present where people are. Because the same could affect the environmental movement, that one flies in from Oslo and says: 'You must say no to this, it is bad for you'. People are often, and rightly, skeptical towards others coming to lecture. (Informant 3)

These quotes do not imply that the informants think this is how FOLVS is perceived by the whole public. That notwithstanding, they clearly display an awareness not only of the pitfalls of being perceived as outsider elites imposing their views, but also of the importance of countering such charges. This is done in two ways. The first involves, as we briefly mentioned in chapter 5.3, a focus on starting a debate about the future of the region. When "[...] the whole point is to get a debate." (Informant 2), it is harder to claim that they are imposing their views. To further dispel the notion of elitism the FOLVS-informants also put emphasis on their local credentials. The informants think that if you are perceived as local, that lends an aura of authenticity, which counters accusations of imposing one's views in an elitist fashion. A similar pattern of reasoning is also employed with regard to where the board leader should operate from: "I think it is really important for FOLVS that the ones who make public statements are in the area [LVS], I don't think [the board leader] could have been, or it would be unfortunate for FOLVS if she had been, in Oslo." (Informant 3). Distancing themselves from the outsider/elitist role, in this case quite literally, can therefore be seen as a strategic move. Even if it doesn't mean that they are cut off, to operate from Lofoten does pose some logistical challenges, especially in a case which will be decided in Oslo and involves substantial lobbying. But on the plus side, not only does it diminish potential charges of being an outside elite, it also emphasizes the connection to the region and facilitates local participation in the governing of the organization.

Elitism, as it is portrayed here can be seen as another variant of moralism. Just like moralism it involves telling people what to do, the difference lies in the person who lectures. The FOLVS-informants want to differentiate FOLVS both from the oil companies and the stereotypical urban environmental preacher. Not only do these actors lack local roots, they are not affected in the same way as the locals are. Avoiding this label should also be seen as a continuation of FOLVS' facilitator role, explored in chapter 6.3. When weary of being identified as imposing elitists, it would be difficult to take on roles where imposing one's views stood central.²⁷

7.4 Negotiating Moderation

As we can see, informants from all the three DMOs identify negative stereotypes in connection with their own organization. Even though the specific stereotype for each organization is distinct, they can all be seen as variants of moralism. Negativism only differs from moralism proper in that it merely involves telling people what they should not do, while elitism's distinguishing mark is found in the status of the person who is lecturing. In all three organizations emphasis was put on the avoidance of being perceived in connection with 'their' stereotype; this took the form of concrete strategies to distance themselves. First of all, what is revealed here is a concern for the public's perception of the organizations' image – an observation that should not be surprising considering the DMOs' positive understanding of *folkebevegelse* and popular participation as seen in chapters 5 and 6. In addition, the stereotypes and their avoidance can both tell us something concrete about each organization and reveal something about the

²⁷ On an additional note one could speculate that a reason behind NNV's decision not to enter as directly into the Lofoten battle as they could have, say through the founding of a proper local group, was to avoid the label of elitist outsider. By helping organize a people's action outside of NNV, the opposition to oil exploration could enjoy both local support and central backing at the same time.

Norwegian environmental sector as a whole. In FIVH, the informants identified moralism as a problem stemming from the organization's educator role. In an attempt to broaden their appeal, FIVH is described as combating this stereotype by framing themselves as more moderate both in their demands and in their image. Similarly, in NNV, the stereotype of negativism is by the informants connected to NNV's opposition to various development projects. By focusing specifically on solutions the organization attempts to challenge this stereotype by appearing more constructive. In FOLVS' case the charge of elitism is connected to their close affiliation with other environmental organizations, and it is challenged by brandishing local credentials and the avoidance of holding lectures. The negative images the organizations are battling are from the informants' perspective not unreasonably hurled upon them by outside agents, but are seen as resulting from the organizations' own activity; they are perceived to have some root in reality.

In contrast to the examples from the literature (see chapter 2.4) – where the emphasis was on attempts to turn negative stereotypes into something positive – the strategy of the DMOs is to distance and dissociate themselves from these labels. Though some in FIVH and NNV accepted moralism as part of their identity, on the whole the impression given was that the DMOs do not dig their heels in fighting to turn moralism, negativism and elitism into something positive. Instead, the way they attempt to gain control over their own image is by framing themselves as more in line with 'normal' people: more moderate in outlook; more constructive in approach; more in-tune with local sentiments. As such it is tempting to claim that the DMOs are engaging in the process described by Snow et al. (1986) as frame transformation, the variant of the four frame alignment processes that closest matches up to our case (see chapter 2.4). But frame transformation is described as planting new values, jettisoning old meanings, and reframing erroneous beliefs (Ibid.: 473). Neither of these fit the DMOs under study. Because the stereotypes have a root in reality the DMOs are

not reframing erroneous beliefs. Instead of jettisoning old meanings, in the case of FIVH and NNV especially, there is an attempt at holding on to their (radical) positions. Nor do the DMOs plant new values, rather they rely on moderating their values so they fit with the values that already are well established within Norwegian society. Also mentioned in chapter 2.4 were the four processes of identity construction, but as these only concerned individuals adapting their identity to fit the movement (Snow and McAdam 2000: 49), they are not applicable in our case. This state of affairs poses the question of how we should describe the identity framing process, which the three DMOs clearly are engaged in.

As I see it the problem can be approached in two opposing ways. The first would claim that through distancing themselves the DMOs attempt to become more acceptable to ‘normal’ or ‘average’ people. From this perspective it seems as if there are forces – practical and cultural – pulling the DMOs from their radical positions toward normality or conformism. From a different perspective, however, the DMOs are not pushed into moderation, they have always been moderate. As we saw in chapter 2, when comparing the attitudes of ordinary people and environmentalists, the Bergen Group could find little difference between the two groups (Grendstad et al. 2006: 85). Instead, then, the distancing could be seen as challenging stereotypes that ‘wrongly’ paint the DMOs as outside of the moderate sphere, their rightful place. Before I discuss these two perspectives further it is necessary to clarify the different senses of the term ‘moderate’ here employed. In chapter 2.3 we saw that the Bergen Group connected the moderate form of environmentalism to the two anomalies called the ‘state-friendly society’ and ‘local community perspective’. The two feed into each other, but for our purposes it makes sense to distinguish between political moderation (the state friendly society), and ideological moderation (the local

community perspective). Since the stereotypes do not involve the relation to the state, what we are concerned with is ideological moderation.²⁸

Here I want to make three points. First, even if Norwegian environmentalists have moderate attitudes in comparison with the rest of the public, this does not mean that the policies of the DMOs by necessity are moderate. Regarding, e.g., hydropower in the case of NNV, and meat consumption in the case of FIVH, the environmental DMOs decidedly have policies that differ from the Norwegian mainstream. Second, the informants clearly understand the situation in terms of the first perspective. For them the stereotypes, as we have seen, have a root in reality. In both NNV and FIVH there are explicit strategies in place that have the intended effect of moderating their image. This is not to say that the DMOs all have radical agendas. The point is that the informants see their organizations as having more radical agendas than the public. Third, the moderation which the informants are describing is not total. They claim that even if they moderate their image, they can still pursue a more radical agenda. In the words of a FIVH-informant: “[...] the level of ambition shall still be as high.” (Informant 6).

The informants want their DMOs to be seen as broad and inclusive, while they at the same time want to be perceived as ideologically uncompromising. In the case of FOLVS the dynamic is different, as the organization has little to gain by keeping an elitist identity. But both FIVH and NNV seem to want to have their cake and eat it too. Such a description is a bit imprecise, however. What the distancing from the stereotypes reveals is that the process which the DMOs seem to be undergoing is better described as a form of frame negotiation, where the DMOs adjust their identity and their agenda (which they perceive to be more radical) to fit a more moderate image. On the one hand, the DMOs are motivated by an urgent need to find adequate solutions to environmental problems of sometimes overwhelming proportions, such as global warming. On the other

²⁸ As a side note, it is interesting in itself that none of the informants mentioned any stereotypes applicable to the close relation the DMOs have with the state.

hand, there are practical and cultural forces pulling these DMOs toward moderate positions. First, as we have seen, the DMOs orient themselves after the culturally specific image of *folkebevegelse*. This orientation, however, is not just a cultural relic, but is mirrored in their practical reliance on the participation of ‘the people’ for funding, clout, and legitimacy. In order to convince ‘the people’ to participate in their campaigns they have to negotiate their position in relation to them. As described by the Bergen Group it is not only the environmentalists, but the Norwegian people as a whole who are steeped in “[...] the national ideal of the local self-reliant community.” (Grendstad et al. 2006: 21). This ideal provides the cultural context of both the DMOs’ interpretation of their own environmental agenda, and ‘the people’s’ moderate environmental leaning. Drawing on the image of a *folkebevegelse*, the DMOs must balance their environmental agenda with the more pragmatic orientation of the Norwegian people, inspired by the local community perspective. In contrast to the Bergen Group, who claims that the Norwegian environmental field is moderate, I want to emphasize the continuing process of negotiated moderation the DMOs are engaged in. As the stereotypes reveal, this is an ongoing process, with strategic elements. The NEM DMOs, then, want to be broad, inclusive *folkebevegelser*, but they also want to champion environmental causes that are outside of the Norwegian mainstream.

Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks

In this thesis I have tried to answer the question of how the Norwegian environmental DMOs understand the relation between their own organizations and ‘the people’. Given both a set of recent developments in the Norwegian environmental sector, including institutionalization, professionalization, and new forms of participation; as well as the fact that the DMOs need public support in order to achieve their objectives, the question seemed a pertinent one. In order to

answer it I have analyzed interview material from 12 informants from NNV, FIVH, and FOLVS. Through keeping close to the source material the analysis focused on describing the shared understanding between the informants, but not to the point of omitting dissenting opinions. A review of the relevant literature on NEM revealed that the study of the relation between the DMOs and ‘the people’ has mainly revolved around assessing whether NEM conforms to the definition of a social movement or a *folkebevegelse*. The fact that neither of these definitions were found to be fitting posed several questions, which I now will attempt to answer in turn.

In the first question I will address it was asked how far Norwegian environmentalism has progressed into a dual-organizational society. In terms of the sector as a whole, our data material is insufficient for providing a complete answer. But, as we saw in chapter 5, from the DMO-informants’ perspective, because the grassroots level is perceived as still having a salient influence on the operation of the DMOs, there is little to indicate a further movement toward a dual-organizational society, at least within the DMOs. The second question asked: What kind of movement is the Norwegian environmental movement if it is not a *folkebevegelse*? The reason the Bergen Group rejected the term was primarily on the count of the organizations’ limited size. Apart from that, however, the term would fit the DMOs reasonably well. The DMO-informants draw on the image of a *folkebevegelse* when describing their own organizations. This involved emphasizing the importance of grassroots engagement, and, as we saw in chapter 6, having an inclusive identity and seeking broad popular appeal. In addition, on a topic present in the interview material, but not explored in detail in this thesis, the informants expressed a cooperative attitude towards the state, even if they challenged many of the state’s decisions. The last point, on the lack of an adversarial character, means that the DMOs would not be considered as a proper social movement (see e.g.: Dryzek et al. 2003: 27). Nevertheless, the DMOs do show other characteristics associated with the SMT-tradition’s

conception of a social movement. Like we saw in chapter 5, the informants perceive their organizations as part of an integrated network of environmental actors, *miljøbevegelsen*. The DMOs, then, combine features from both the traditional Norwegian conception of *folkebevegelse*, and from the SMT-tradition. It should be pointed out, however, that the most prominent features of these movement conceptions – the size of a *folkebevegelse*, the adversarial character and distinct identity of a social movement – was not associated with the DMOs.

The third question – How should the relation between ‘the people’ and the Norwegian environmental DMOs be assessed? – is obviously related to the one answered above. But I will also add that the relation should be viewed as a process of negotiated moderation. As we saw in chapter 2, the Bergen Group characterizes the sector as moderate, both politically and ideologically. But they focus on the environmental field as a whole, thus omitting the role identity can play in connection with single organizations. Further, Kapstad sees the identity problematic in terms of the individual participant, not in terms of the collective or in relation to the specific context of the organization. The way organizational identity operates in relation to the DMOs context was in our case explored through the phenomenon of stereotypes. Through the stereotype analysis we could see that the DMOs engage in a negotiation process where their radical aspirations and agenda had to fit a more moderate image in order to appeal to ‘the people’.

The analysis has shown that despite the differences between the three organizations in terms of history, development, size, and focus, the Norwegian environmental DMOs under study exhibit similarities in the three areas of analysis. The DMOs value popular participation and relate to the same Norwegian understanding of what a movement is. Their roles in relation to the people show great similarities as they are all concerned with assisting activism. The negative stereotypes associated with them are all variants of the same

stereotype, and the way they react to their negative image is also broadly similar. These similarities are best viewed as imprints of the shared context of their operation.

The exploratory approach followed in this thesis has enabled us to give a description of the Norwegian DMOs in terms of their movement connection and identity. The approach we have followed is, however, not without its problems, and I will end the thesis on some methodological considerations. First of all, the findings are based on a non-representative selection of informants. This has yielded insights into the workings of the organizations. It is nevertheless important to note that when I have used the phrasing ‘the informants say/claim/understand’ in the plural, it might in some cases only have indicated that two informants held that opinion. This is not necessarily discrediting in itself, especially when the informants were not randomly selected, but purposefully sought out because of their familiarity with the topic. However, to see if the understandings here described are as widespread as the impression given from the small pool of informants here relied on, the findings must be confirmed with more extensive surveys of other central actors within the organizations. The findings could also have been strengthened through the process of triangulation, with a more extensive use of secondary material, such as official documents. The thesis should in this regard be viewed as a first step into exploring how the DMOs understand the relation between themselves and ‘the people’.

Second, the interpretation of the informants’ understanding was reached through examining their statements, piecing the statements together thematically and organizing them in a coherent fashion with each organizational context in mind. First of all, this means that my interpretation does not necessarily reflect how the organizations present themselves officially. This does not have to be problematic, in fact, it could be seen as a virtue of the undertaking as it provides a view under the hood of the organization. A serious methodological problem does emerge

however, from this approach. By attempting to reveal the shared understanding among the informants, the limit between what the informants say and what the interpreter brings to the table gets blurred. The process of looking at commonalities and illustrating that through the selection of quotes risks imposing a direction to the material. This is perhaps an unavoidable feature of such an interpretive approach, but also one I, to the best of my ability, have tried to minimize by keeping close to the source material.

The last shortcoming I will describe here lies in the thesis' relatively exclusive focus on the form of environmentalism, as opposed to its content. The two are obviously interlinked and inform each other. The analysis would have been greatly improved if it also could have provided a deeper description of ideological and cultural factors impinging on the topic. But, even if there were place to include it, a focus on ideology was never a part of the idea behind the thesis, and, consequently, was not represented in the interview material.

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Appendix 1: Interview Guide

Introduksjon

- Kan du kort fortelle meg hva din rolle i organisasjonen er?
 - Hva vil du si er de viktigste målene og oppgavene til organisasjonen du jobber i?
 - Hvordan bidrar du til å oppnå disse målene?

Aktør og Strategi

- Hvordan vil du beskrive din organisasjons rolle? I samfunnet/ som politisk aktør?
 - På hvilken måte jobber din organisasjon (som helhet) for å oppnå målene sine?
 - Hva er de viktigste strategiene dere bruker for å få gjennomslag for målene?
 - Har er styrkene og svakhetene?
 - Har disse strategiene endret seg? Er de i behov for å endres?
 - Hva er grunnen til at dere har valgt disse og ikke andre strategier?
 - Hvilken rolle spiller «folket» i disse strategiene?

Folket

- Hvilken rolle spiller din organisasjon overfor det brede lag av folket?
 - Hvor viktig er det med en bred folkelig støtte?
 - Kan man klare seg uten?
 - Hvordan går dere fram for å mobilisere folk?
 - Er organisasjonen din (en del av) en folkebevegelse?
 - I hvor stor grad har dere prøvd å bygge opp en massebevegelse?
 - Vil dere endre på folket? Forbedre det?
 - Er dere redde for å støte fra dere noen?
 - Hvem er det som hører på dere?
 - Hvordan blir dere oppfattet av folket? Har de fordommer?
 - Påvirker dette hvordan dere legger opp kampanjer/strategier?

Medlemsmassen

- Hvilken rolle har din organisasjon overfor medlemmene deres?
 - Hvordan vil du beskrive medlemsaktiviteten i organisasjonen deres?
 - På hvilken måte har dere forsøkt å involvere medlemmene i aktivitetene deres?
 - Hvor viktig er det med en aktiv medlemsbase?
 - I hvor stor grad har dere lyktes med å aktivisere medlemmer?
 - I hvor stor grad har dere prøvd å skape en bred bevegelse?

- Er det store forskjeller i aktivitetsnivå mellom ledelsen/de mest aktive og det vanlige medlemmet?

Informasjon

- Hvilken rolle har informasjonsspredning i arbeidet deres?
 - Ser dere på dere selv som en folkeopplyser?
 - I hvor stor grad lykkes dere?
 - Har dere spesielle målgrupper dere forsøker å nå?
 - Vinkler dere sakene på en spesiell måte? Flere måter? Hvilke?
 - Er det noen fallgruver når dere kommuniserer i media? med folk?

Oppsummering

- Hvis du skal oppsummere:
 - Hva er det som gjør at deres mål får gjennomslag og hva er det som hindrer gjennomslag?
 - Hvilke strategier opplever dere som virkningsfulle?
 - Hvilke kampanjer opplever dere som virkningsfulle?